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16.12.201308:47
Источник изображения: ИА "Авеста"

Выпуск-22

id: 54747

date: 3/1/2006 10:14

refid: 06DUSHANBE403

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

destination:

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----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000403

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EB

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EINV, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENT'S OFFICE UNDERTAKES TO ANSWER U/S SHINER'S

LETTER ADVOCATING RESOLUTION OF THE GERALD METALS COMMERCIAL DISPUTE

REF: WALTERS-HOAGLAND E-MAIL DTD 02-28-06

1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet.

2.  (SBU) During a March 1 meeting with Presidential Foreign

Policy Adviser Erkin Rahmatulloyev, the Ambassador asked when

Under Secretary Shiner can expect a reply to her December 2005

letter to President Rahmonov advocating resolution of the Gerald

Metals commercial dispute with the Tajik Aluminum Plant (TadAZ).

 To our surprise, Rahmatulloyev stood up, went to his in-box,

and fished out a thick file.  Enunciating precisely, as he does

when dealing with a serious issue, he said he has been

personally involved with this case, even though trade and

commercial issues are not his portfolio, since the Shiner letter

was delivered to the President's office December 19.

3.  (SBU) Initially, Rahmatulloyev said that the issue has

unfortunately acquired an "unnecessary emphasis" in the

bilateral relationship, and that a "commercial-economic" dispute

should not become political.  Without notes, he reviewed the

recent judicial history of the dispute and noted that Gerald

Metals has not yet exercised its right to appeal the most recent

decision by the Higher Economic Court of Tajikistan, implying

that the ball is currently in Gerald Metals' court.  He noted

the Tajik government's touch of heartburn at "hints" in letters

from U.S. senators about the case that Tajikistan's judicial

system is biased.

4.  (SBU) Rahmatulloyev passed a thick file of recent court

documents on the case to the Ambassador and asked him to study

them closely, because the Higher Economic Court had made its

most recent decision "in accordance with our law as it now

exists."  He then added, "It is our view that both sides should

come to a compromise.  The President's sincere desire is to have

a fair settlement.  We are ready for further contact on this

issue."

5.  (SBU) Rahmatulloyev admitted that TadAZ's management has

seen "upheaval in recent years," and, without elaborating, that

there had previously been "lots of illegal interference in its

affairs."

6.  (SBU) Focusing on the point that President Rahmonov wants a

"fair settlement," the Ambassador recommended that Rahmatulloyev

request a letter from Rahmonov stating that sentiment to Under

Secretary Shiner.  He suggested it would be wise to have such a

SIPDIS

letter in Washington before Minister of Industry Saidov meets

senior officials in the Commerce Department March 22.

Rahmatulloyev agreed with this approach and said he would do his

best to follow through.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 54923

date: 3/2/2006 5:15

refid: 06DUSHANBE408

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination: 06DUSHANBE151

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----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000408

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/2/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KISL, KDEM, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:  IRPT LEADER CLOSELY WATCHED

REF: DUSHANBE 151

CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD HOAGLAND, AMBASSADOR, DUSHANBE,

TAJIKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.  (C)  Muhiddin Kabiri, First Deputy Chairman of the Islamic

Renaissance Party (IRPT) will travel to the United States March

8 to deliver a speech at Columbia University on the state of

religion and politics in Tajikistan after the wave of "color

revolutions" in other post-Soviet countries.  Kabiri told PolOff

February 27 the government disapproved of his trip to the United

States.

2.  (C)  When Kabiri notified Tajikistan's Parliamentary Speaker

of his impending absence, the Speaker questioned why Kabiri had

to attend the lecture in New York.  Despite Kabiri's insistence

that he would go with or without the Speaker's permission, the

Speaker insisted he himself would consult with the President's

Office about Kabiri's trip.  Austria's Ministry of Foreign

Affairs also invited Kabiri to speak in Vienna in March, and the

Speaker instructed Kabiri to attend Austria's conference instead

of the lecture at Columbia University.  According to Kabiri, the

Tajik government suspects the United States is inviting

perceived opposition leaders, like himself, to come and engage

in discussions about possibly stirring up a "color revolution"

in Tajikistan.  The President's Office ultimately consented to

Kabiri's travel, but when he returns from the United States he

will have to submit financial records and a report of his trip's

activities.

3.  (C)  During a recent Parliament session, Kabiri brought up

the problem of BBC's registration and advocated for more varied

media sources.  Fellow parliamentarians chastised him for even

bringing up the issue and dismissed it simply as BBC's failure

to follow Tajik laws, the standard government line.  In public

and private, government officials have accused Kabiri of being

an "agent of influence" for the West.  Because of this

reputation, Kabiri says he has periodically made comments

criticizing U.S. foreign policy in the media to fend off

critics' attacks.  In meetings with EmbOffs he often mentions

how he is always trying to stay out of jail, and out of trouble

with the government.  He has also mentioned how he sees the IRPT

as a "loyal" opposition party.

4.  (C)  Kabiri told PolOff the Russian Ambassador Abdulatipov's

public statements supporting Rahmonov for re-election offended

him (reftel).  Mostly, he was disappointed that his fellow

parliamentarians did not react.  He posited that if a

representative of the United States made such a comment, it

would be seen as interference and many would be outraged.

Kabiri explained this attitude reflects a broader outlook in

Parliament.  According to him, most Tajik officials view

Tajikistan as a protectorate of Russia with Rahmonov as a puppet

leader and Abdulatipov the General Governor of Tajikistan.

Recently, one parliamentarian was overheard commenting, "If

Rahmonov can't solve this problem for me, I will go to Putin."

5.  (C)  COMMENT:  The government's attempts at marginalizing

the IRPT's Kabiri as an "Agent of the West" seem a bit ironic,

and out of step with global politics.  Instead, the government

may fear the IRPT's genuine popularity-Kabiri is one of the few

politicians outside the President's party with a true base of

support.  In the months leading to the Presidential election,

the government may step up it efforts to discredit and

marginalize Kabiri.  To counter this, and save his image, he may

feel the need to increase his public comments against the West.

However, he is still a moderate Islamic leader who understands

DUSHANBE 00000408  002 OF 002

Western democratic values.  END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 54986

date: 3/2/2006 11:25

refid: 06DUSHANBE410

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----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL, PM

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/14/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, RS, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIK BORDER UPDATE

REF: DUSHANBE 390

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy

Dushanbe, State.

REASON: 1.4 (b)

1.  (SBU) This begins a series of cables summarizing

Tajikistan's border security developments and activities of

Embassy Dushanbe's Border Law Enforcement Working Group (BLEWG).

 Led by the DCM, with participation from the Senior Law

Enforcement Advisor (SLEA), the EXBS advisor, the Defense

Attachi's Office (DAO), Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC),

Pol/Econ, Pol/Mil and others, the BLEWG is an interagency

working established in 2005 to coordinate all aspects of USG

border security assistance.  This cable covers activities for

February 2006.

2.  (SBU) At the February 16 meeting of the Border Interagency

Group (BIG), donor agencies formed a Canine Working group to

better coordinate assistance with donors and government

ministries and avoid duplication of efforts.  Currently, the

Ministry of Interior (MOI), Drug Control Agency (DCA), and

Border Guards all have drug-detecting programs, but there has

been no coordination or decision at the government level about

who would run or fund dog centers, provide veterinary care or

training.   SLEA will work with UN Office of Drug Control

(UNODC) and other major donors to standardize the dog programs.

Donors also agreed to from a training committee to coordinate

all law enforcement training.

3.  (U)  Ambassador Hoagland and Russian Ambassador Abdulatipov

attended the graduation of Ministry of Interior trainees

February 17.  A Swedish-Russian contractor conducted the

U.S.-funded training at a MOI new criminal intelligence center

in Dushanbe

4.  (C)  At a private reception in his honor February 20,

General Zuhurov, Chairman of the State Border Protection

Committee, highlighted the United States' close relationship

with Tajikistan and Russia's waning influence with the Border

Guards. The dynamics of the private reception indicated that for

all the press attention on Russian assistance and cooperation,

the Border guards consider the United States a true ally

(reftel).

5.  (SBU) General Zuhurov told SLEA his trip to the United

States, tentatively scheduled for March, has been postponed

until June.  Presidential Advisor Rahmatulloyev confirmed to the

Ambassador the President's Office preferred Zuhurov travel in

June, after the May Counternarcotics Conference.

6.  (SBU) Planning continues for the May CENTCOM/Marshall Center

sponsored Counternarcotics Conference, which the Tajiks continue

to enthusiastically support.

7.  (SBU)  SLEA reports helicopter and truck deliveries of the

$3.2 million of food, fuel and uniforms continue at a slow, but

steady pace to border posts (zastavas) along the Tajik-Afghan

border in Moscovskiy district.  The Border Guards took

possession of eight U.S.-funded ambulances to operate at each of

the eight border posts identified for U.S. assistance.

8.  (SBU)  SLEA and EmbOff completed an assessment Khurmanjo

border post February 19.  This pilot renovation project will

serve as a model for future and is scheduled to begin

construction in late spring.

9.  (U)  Drug interdictions for February (as reported by the

Tajik Press):  160 kg of heroin, raw opium and cannabis in four

raids by the DCA, Border Guards and Ministry of Interior.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 55305

date: 3/4/2006 6:47

refid: 06DUSHANBE419

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

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----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000419

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/14/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, ECON, EINV, EAID, ENRG, TI, CH

SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO TAJIKISTAN: "WHY NOT COOPERATE IN

CENTRAL ASIA?"

REF: A) DUSHANBE 63   B) DUSHANBE 301  C) DUSHANBE 326

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy

Dushanbe, State.

REASON: 1.4 (b)

1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Chinese Ambassador to Tajikistan Li Huilai

said China shared many of the United States' priorities in

Tajikistan, including economic growth, counter-terrorism and

border stability.  In a very frank and open 90-minute meeting

with Ambassador Hoagland, Li suggested there was room for

Chinese-U.S. security and economic cooperation in Tajikistan.

END SUMMARY.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND HYDROPOWER

2.  (C) China plans to invest in roads, hydropower stations

(HPS), and modernizing the telecommunication sector in

Tajikistan.  The China Development Bank had offered the other

countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a total

of $900 million at low interest rates, and Tajikistan intended

to apply for some of that assistance.   However, they have not

yet finalized negotiations on any particular projects.  Li noted

with some frustration that, unlike the Uzbeks, who negotiated

very quickly, the Tajiks were "more nuanced" and invoked the

Tajik Civil War and their need for stability during

negotiations.  However, a delegation from the Chinese

Development Bank would arrive in Dushanbe soon and he was

confident they would reach an agreement.

3.  (C) Li acknowledge the Chinese were interested in Shurob HPS

or Rogun, but said no feasibility studies had been conducted for

any hydropower projects, including the Varzob cascade.

(COMMENT:  This contradicts comments the Deputy Energy Minister

Silantiev and the Chinese Trade Attachi made to PolOff (Reftels

A and B).  END COMMENT.) He noted that Chinese investment in

Shurob would depend on the plans for Rogun-if the dam built at

Rogun was too high, it would not make a HPS at Shorub worth the

investment.

4.  (C) China would consider working with American companies on

its infrastructure projects, according to Li.  (COMMENT:  This

also contradicts the Chinese Trade Attachi's comments to PolOff

that only Chinese firms would be eligible to participate in

Chinese investment projects (Reftel B).  END COMMENT.)  Li

indicated an international consortium could be useful.  "Where

are we going to export that power?" he asked, if the

international community was not in agreement.  He specifically

said U.S. companies would be welcome to build transmission

lines.  Li agreed that Dost-I-Zhum hydropower station would only

be viable if the Tajik government proved successful with

Sangtuda I and II, and Rogun (reftel C).

"WHY NOT COOPERATE IN CENTRAL ASIA?"

5.  (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador, that the large powers

needed to coordinate their message and efforts in Tajikistan, Li

noted China's enormous trade surplus over the past five years

meant real benefits for the Chinese and other countries China

helped.  He listened with interest as the Ambassador explained

areas where U.S. consultants have highlighted investment

opportunities in Tajikistan, such as mining, energy,

agriculture, transport and telecom.

BORDER ISSUES

6.  (C) Li observed the Chinese border was the quietest portion

of the Tajik border last year, with no incidents.  Within two

years, he estimated that the demarcation process would be

complete and the border region would remain peaceful and stable.

 The border post at Kalma was currently only open from May to

October, although the Tajiks had repeatedly asked China to keep

the border crossing open year-round.  Li noted that to do that,

DUSHANBE 00000419  002 OF 002

they would need better infrastructure and housing built at a

lower elevation for border guards and customs workers.

7.  (C) The Tajik-Afghan border concerned China, particularly

after the departure of the Russian Border Guards.  Narcotics

made their way to China either through Burma or from Afghanistan

through Central Asia; they had noticed a rise in traffic along

the latter "northern" route recently.  Li remarked that in a

meeting with General Zuhurov of the Tajik Border Guards, Li had

noted the lack of professionalism and training of the current

leadership of the Border Guards.   China has donated vehicles

and uniforms to equip Tajik border forces.

8.  (C) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was considering

establishing a counternarcotics center in Central Asia, and

planned to invite Afghanistan to participate. "Without

Afghanistan there would be no point," he noted.

COUNTERTERRORISM:  ROOM FOR MORE COOPERATION

9.  (C) Li expressed China's concern over the terrorist group,

the Eastern Turkistan Organization, and noted that his Embassy

receives monthly threat reports.  He highlighted the death of a

Chinese diplomat and the death of 12 businessmen last year in

Kyrgyzstan as evidence that China also faces terrorism on

regular basis.  Li characterized his embassy's relationship with

Tajikistan's Ministry of Security (MoS) as "at the beginning

stages, "needing better cooperation.  "There is very little

information sharing.  We don't know if it's because they don't

have information, or will not share."  Li attributed the

situation to a lack of experience in the MoS.  "Tajikistan is a

young republic," he said.  The Ministry of Security is not very

professional, he opined, staffed with "family and friends" of

the powerful.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

10. (C) Li noted the coming year would bring China and

Tajikistan closer.  President Rahmonov planned to visit Beijing.

 The SCO would convene a meeting in Dushanbe as well.  Li

parried the Ambassador's suggestion that the SCO could help

motivate Uzbekistan to open its borders to its neighbors by

proposing that Uzbekistan's recent accession to the Eurasia

Economic community would provide better leverage.

11. (C)  Li summed up China's policy for Tajikistan as reform,

development, and stability.  In closing, he mentioned an article

he had read, stating the CIA anticipated two more color

revolutions in former Soviet Republics.  "I hate to be

immodest," he smiled, "But will one be in Tajikistan?  Belarus?

Uzbekistan?"  The Ambassador put in context for Li DNI

Negroponte's recent testimony to Congress.  Tongue-in-cheek, he

told Li that Tajikistan is not on the "color revolution"

schedule for this year.

12.  (C) COMMENT:  Li's openness to share information comes in

marked contrast to the meeting with the Trade Attachi, who was

extremely reticent about Chinese investment and priorities in

Tajikistan.  Quite possibly, Li feels freer to speak openly and

has the authority to reveal policy and priorities that others on

his team do not.  Li's openness to collaboration of U.S. and

Chinese companies in building Tajikistan's hydropower

infrastructure, if accurate, is encouraging.  END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 55358

date: 3/6/2006 8:00

refid: 06BRUSSELS731

origin: Embassy Brussels

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination:

header:

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000731

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GG, AM, AJ, TX, KZ, TI, KG, USEU BRUSSELS

SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA,

AND ENERGY SECURITY WITH EU OFFICIALS

Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

1. (C) Summary: In U.S.-EU COEST Troika consultations on

Caucasus and Central Asia on February 23, EUR DAS Matt Bryza

discussed with EU officials how to change the dynamic of

discussions on South Ossetia.  Echoing an EU Presidency

statement on February 21, EU representatives agreed that  the

international community should explore the idea of a new

forum besides the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to negotiate

a political settlement for South Ossetia. EU officials

acknowledged that Russian intransigence is

an impediment in negotiations but said that Georgian rhetoric

and behavior should also be moderated.  EU Special

Representative (EUSR) for Caucasus Talvitie said that it is

also important to say that the JCC still has a function in

implementing previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1

and 2 of Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan:

de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic

rehabilitation.  All agreed that discussions on

Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) should continue despite the missed

opportunities at the Feb.10-11 summit at Rambouillet.  The

Austrian Presidency said it would like to help the cause of

Armenian/Turkish relations during its tenure.  EUSR believes

that the South Caucasus has a European future and it would be

valuable to try to convince officials in Moscow of this.  On

Central Asia, the Austrian Presidency said it will have a

series of events focused on Central Asia starting in April in

Astana.  On Kazakhstan, the European Commission highlighted

three goals: 1) Support democratic

reforms; 2) Assist in WTO accession; 3) Engage on energy.  On

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, EU has not been able to

effectively address its priorities of democratization and

poverty alleviation because of its limited representation.

However, all agreed that promotion of moderate Islam in

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be key to EU/US interests in

the region.  There are no improvements in EU relations

with Uzbekistan.  Regarding Turkmenistan, the EU pushed the

idea of having human rights consultations in Ashgabat and

promoting a constructive energy dialogue to promote European

energy security. End Summary.

Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia

----------------------------

2. (C) DAS Bryza acknowledged the Austrian EU Presidency,s

February 21 statement on South Ossetia, which noted that the

JCC should be judged according to the results it achieved,

and that the international community should look at other

avenues for negotiation.  Bryza suggested that one

possibility could be a

forthcoming OSCE Donors' Conference for South Ossetia, which

would be attended by the EU and OSCE and member states from

these organizations, and which could build momentum towards a

new and potentially more successful negotiation process.

Commission staff expressed caution, and Talvitie, while

acknowledging

the JCC's limitations, stressed that it is important for us

to say that the JCC still has a function: implementing

previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1 and 2 of

Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan:

de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic

rehabilitation.

3. (C) Talvitie urged a cautious approach on negotiations,

wondering whether we should first acknowledge Russia,s

preference to discuss de-militarization of South Ossetia

before moving on status discussions.  Talvitie nevertheless

stressed it should be made clear to the Russians that we do

want to discuss status soon.  DAS Bryza acknowledged this

reality but expressed concern that the Georgians need to see

soon that there is a "light at the end of the tunnel" before

they get discouraged and therefore emboldened.  The Russians

need to understand that our leverage over the Georgians faces

real limits, and Georgians may resort to force if they feel

they lack support in the international community to press

Russia to cooperate in advancing a peaceful, negotiated

settlement.  Thus, the status quo that Russia seems to seek

may not actually exist.  DAS Bryza expressed appreciation at

the February 21 EU statement on South Ossetia noting we might

build on it to  changeing the dynamic of negotiations over

the conflict.  Bryza lamented that Russia had taken several

provocative steps in recent days with respect to the South

Ossetia conflict, including: walking back its agreement to

attend a JCC session in Vienna if the Georgian parliament

moderated its resolution calling for the withdrawal of

Russia,s peacekeeping operation, (which the Georgian

Parliament did in fact do); falsely dubbing a meeting in

Moscow with the Ossetians a JCC (even though Amb. Kenyaikin

assured Bryza this would be only an informal, preparatory

meeting for a later JCC), and then claiming Georgia and the

OSCE refused to attend the "JCC;" canceling Georgian Prime

Minister Noghaideli,s meeting with Russian PM Fradkov,

(which the Russians pledged to hold if the Georgian

Parliament moderated its resolution); and reportedly

conducting military over flights of Georgian territory.  EU

interlocutors agreed such Russian behavior appeared designed

to be provocative, and recognized that the Georgian side had

indeed moderated its behavior in recent weeks, as requested

by Moscow.

Armenia/Azerbaijan

------------------

4. (C) Representing the incoming Finnish Presidency, Petteri

Vuoromaki urged the continued work of OSCE

co-chairs on N-K negotiations and believed that we needed to

"rein in" both parties because the rhetoric is getting too

aggressive.  He expressed concern that Azerbaijan may soon

become bellicose on N-K as it begins to fortify its army from

its oil windfall.  EUSR Talvitie conveyed that one high-level

Azeri official expressed to him the desire for additional

peace negotiations since the Rambouillet talks failed to make

any progress.  The Austrian Presidency believed that we could

see a Russian effort "to deliver" a solution for N-K by this

summer's G-8 summit in order to portray itself as a

peacemaking nation while continuing to forestall negotiations

on South Ossetia.

5. (C) DAS Bryza said that Rambouillet was not a complete

failure, that Azerbaijani President Aliyev had made a

significant offer, that the ball was now in the Armenian

court, and that Moscow had a chance to deliver Yerevan. DAS

Bryza expressed hope that Turkey would agree to open its

border with Armenia should Armenia withdraw from territories

it currently occupies in Azerbaijan as part of a broader deal

on NK.   The Austrian Presidency said that it is interested

in advancing Turkish/Armenian relations during its tenure and

would work to achieve this end.

6. (C) EUSR Talvitie said that we needed to approach

democratization of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an

"evolutionary" mindset.  He welcomed the U.S. statement

following Azerbaijani elections in early November.  He

believes transformation can happen there but that we will

have to be patient.  In a humorous aside, EUSR said that when

he goes to Baku and Yerevan to speak to their respective

Parliaments, he gets standing ovations when he proclaims that

the "EU is for evolution, not for revolution!"  However, he

receives a standing ovation in Tbilisi when he propounds in

Parliament that "the EU is for revolution, not for

evolution!"  However, he believes that it is worthwhile to

convince a tough crowd in Europe that the South Caucasus has

a European identity and future; he thought this was common

ground for the EU and US to work together.  Expressing

optimism about President Aliyev, Talvitie said that Aliyev

will need time to simultaneously shed the "dead-wood" from

his father's entourage while building his

own political base.  The EC said it will be opening offices

in Azerbaijan in 2007.

Kazakhstan

----------

7. (C) The Commission said its goals for Kazakhstan are

threefold: 1) Support democratic reforms; 2) Assist in WTO

accession; 3) Engage on energy.  The EC believes that

market-driven energy climate in Kazakhstan is important and

it will work to achieve this; it supports the idea of

multiple sources of energy through multiple pipelines.  DAS

Bryza said that Kazakhstan is emerging as the key partner in

the region and that the EU/US should work with Kazakhstan,s

new Deputy Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, to  help him move

reforms forward.  All agreed that Kazakhstan's bid for the

2009 OSCE Chairman-in-Office is problematic, but we should

not rule out future bids.

Tajikistan

----------

8. (C) The Commission pointed out that Tajikistan is the most

important and biggest recipient of the Commission's aid in

Central Asia.  However, given the EU's limited representation

in Dushanbe, efforts to channel this aid to effective use for

poverty alleviation are hamstrung.  The EC expressed concern

about President Rahmonov's systematic repression of political

candidates and the Tajik Parliament's consideration of an NGO

law that would require continued re-registration of foreign

NGOs represented in

the country; the EC considers this proposal misguided and

would seriously impede their NGO operations.

9. (C) All parties agreed on the importance of helping

Tajikistan Bolster its traditions of tolerant faith and

scientific learning to counter foreign missionaries,

attempts to import extremist interpretations of  Islam.  DAS

Bryza conveyed that this is an important area for EU/US

cooperation and that together we can help remind Tajiks of

the importance of their indigenous history and their

deeply-held, moderate Islamic roots.  The Austrian Presidency

believed that, together, the EU and US should convey to

Rahmonov that having a moderate Islamic political party in

his government is a positive sign.  DAS Bryza concurred and

said that the USG has been trying to send this message but

Rahmonov's

mistrust of political opposition is hindering progress on

this front.

Kyrgyzstan

----------

10. (C) EU officials expressed worry about Kyrgyzstan

trending "from bad to worse."  Political discussions between

the EU and the Kyrgyz government have been disappointing,

Council officials said, and the economy is not only slowing,

but contracting.  The Commission made reference to a

cooperation agreement that was signed on February 3 between

Turkish Cypriots and Kyrgyzstan; the EC believes that Moscow

might have encouraged this deal to be signed as a way to

drive a wedge between Brussels and

Bishkek.  Further enshrouding this situation was when the EU

asked the Kyrgyz government for the substance of the

agreement, the Kyrgyz declined saying the agreement is

confidential.  Furthermore, the EC thought it was odd that

SIPDIS

the Turkish Prime Minister recently received the Kyrgyz

Foreign Minister.  DAS Bryza believed that the pull from

Moscow is  strong right now in Bishkek (as it is in Dushanbe)

and therefore we have to work extra hard to advance

democratization in these two countries.  We have a

real interest in seeing Kyrgyzstan succeed - therefore, we

have to promote democracy.  Stability comes

legitimacy, which derives from democracy.  EU officials

agreed with DAS Bryza that the GOK risked prompting a

resurgence of civil unrest if it failed to advance democratic

and constitutional reform and fight corruption.  Civil

society (fortunately) remained vibrant in Kyrgyzstan, and

expected President Bakiyev to deliver on his promises to

provide justice and prosperity.

Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan

---------------------

11. (C) The Austrian Presidency conveyed that there have been

no improvements in the EU's relationship with Tashkent.

There is little incentive for the EU to cooperate with

Uzbekistan as the Karimov government says it wants to be able

to choose which EU NGOs can operate in the country; if the EU

does not allow this, the Commission said, the government has

said it will make life extremely difficult

for NGOs there.  Citing no improvement in US-Uzbek relations,

DAS Bryza said the U.S. aimed to sustain its current - albeit

modest - level of engagement with Uzbekistan.  The U.S. had

made a conscious decision to criticize the GOU,s

indiscriminate use of force in Andijan, in full recognition

that this would likely cost us access to the air base at

Karshi Khanabad. Karimov was uncomfortable in the

position he is in right now being wholly dependent on Beijing

and Moscow.  Perhaps he would come to his senses and realize

the only way to end the descending spiral of

repression-extremism-repression-extremism was to embrace

reform rather than repression.  In the long run, the United

States and the people of Uzbekistan would hopefully be able

to work together to help the people of Uzbekistan embrace the

moderate traditions of Classical Islam that were born a

millennium ago in what is today Uzbekistan.  This was perhaps

the most effective way to counter the extremist threat that

Hizb-U-Tahir poses to Uzbekistan.

12. (C) On Turkmenistan, DAS Bryza called on  the EU/US to

explore whether a trans-Caspian gas pipeline might bolster

European energy security.  DAS Bryza explained that   Niyazov

was indicating interest in a Trans-Caspian Pipeline to

provide him some leverage in dealing with Gazprom, thereby

allowing him to negotiate a gas sales price that Gazprom

could no longer dictate and which was closer to prices in the

European market.  The Austrian Presidency shared these

opinions but also pushed to have

human rights conversations with Turkmen officials in Ashgabat

(where, they said, a lot of government officials actually

show up for these meetings).  DAS Bryza agreed, recounting

how he told President Niyazov in January that securing the

participation of U.S. companies and/or export finance

organizations like OPIC in a trans-Caspian pipeline would

require progress on democracy and human rights.

Energy Security

---------------

13. (C) DAS Bryza discussed the broader issue of European

energy security with EU officials.  The U.S. sought to

enhance European energy security because the more secure

Europe is, the more secure the U.S. will be, and because U.S.

interests are served when markets function well.  While we do

not want confrontation with Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom, we

share an interest with our European friends in Europe

diversifying Europe,s gas supplies away from Gazprom.  We

could do so by relying on market mechanisms.  Our goal is to

accelerate upstream investment by private companies in gas

production in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Iraq, which in

turn will provide Europe confidence that it can negotiate

more firmly with Gazprom on pricing without locking itself

into long-term deals that increase its dependence on a singly

supplier of gas.  But convincing upstream producers to

accelerate their investments would require Europeans to

provide requisite regulatory reforms and pipeline

infrastructure to receive Central Asian gas.  Turkmenistan

figures prominently in this strategy, since its gas reserves

are the largest currently in play for delivery to Europe via

either the Gazprom network or a new corridor running across

the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, then through Georgia and

Turkey to Greece and Italy,  and/or to Romania, Bulgaria,

Hungary, and Austria.  As such a "Southern Corridor" emerges,

the large split between Central Asian and European gas prices

would gradually diminish, thereby eliminating the enormous

rents that fuel organized crime and lack of energy sector

reform along pipeline routes.  Moreover, as Gazprom lost the

ability to force Central Asian countries to sell it cheap

gas, it would need to reform itself internally to attract

foreign investors required to develop gas fields in Russia.

This was the only way to channel Gazprom toward more

market-based and therefore, constructive behavior.  EU

officials took on board this message.  They agreed on the

need to eliminate the price differentials between gas bought

in Central Asia and Europe and agreed commercial competition

was the best and perhaps only way to channel Gazprom toward

reform rather than acquisition of European energy assets.

EUSR said that the EU will play an important role in

advancing energy security in its dialogue with Turkey.  The

EU said a green paper on European energy security would be

forthcoming in the spring.

14. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.

McKinley

.

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 55377

date: 3/6/2006 10:48

refid: 06DUSHANBE442

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

destination:

header:

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PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG

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----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000442

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KPAO, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIK STUDENTS DEMAND APOLOGY FROM EMBASSY OVER 2004 HUMAN

RIGHTS REPORT

REF: 05 DUSHANBE 2014

1.  (U)  Students from Tajikistan's Technological University

published an open letter March 2 criticizing by name an Embassy

Public Affairs Section FSN for distributing the State

Department's 2004 Human Rights Report on Tajikistan.   The

students charge the report with being slanderous and inaccurate.

 They said the report does not give enough attention to positive

steps Tajikistan has made towards improving human rights.  They

fear the publication and distribution of such "black

information" undermines Tajikistan's international reputation.

Claiming the employee offended the Tajik people's dignity, and

motivated by patriotism, the students demanded an apology from

the Embassy employee to the students and the Tajik government.

Two newspapers have published this open letter so far.

2.  (U)  During a human rights roundtable at Tajik Technological

University December 12, EmbOffs distributed Russian-language

copies of last year's Human Rights Report on Tajikistan and

engaged students in a two-hour conversation (ref).  Prior to

December 12, the government purposely tried to block EmbOffs

from holding the roundtable.  Post originally approached the

Russian-government-sponsored Russian-Tajik Slavonic University

to host a discussion on human rights.  When the Russian Embassy

vetoed that plan, Post asked Tajik Technological University, but

was refused by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  After the

Embassy hand-delivered a diplomatic note to the president's

adviser, the government finally relented at the last minute and

allowed EmbOffs to speak with students at the Technological

University.

3.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Given the government's original disproval

of the human rights discussion with students, post suspects the

government had a hand in the open letter, although it was

attributed to the students.  The letter is an attempt to

discredit the Human Rights Report-the 2005 version slated for a

March 8 release.  Post will send the media a response letter

from the Ambassador.   END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 55383

date: 3/6/2006 11:23

refid: 06DUSHANBE443

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: UNCLASSIFIED

destination: 06DUSHANBE239

header:

VZCZCXRO8900

PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG

DE RUEHDBU #0443/01 0651123

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 061123Z MAR 06

FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6893

INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1426

RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1467

RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1456

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1407

RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1356

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1422

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1381

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1315

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1226

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1457

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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1007

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0800

RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8015

----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000443

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, EUR/PPD, R, P, S/P, EUR

NSC FOR MLLARD, MERKEL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PROP, EINV, SNAR, SOCI, KPAO, RS, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:  DISTORTED VIEWS FROM THE EDUCATED STREET

REF: DUSHANBE 0239

DUSHANBE 00000443  001.2 OF 002

1.  SUMMARY:  Distorted views of U.S. policy and goals

originate, in large part, in the Russian mass media, which

dominate Tajikistan's information space.  Reputable and

independent international broadcasts in Russian, perhaps from a

CNN Russian Service, would help to alleviate this problem.  END

SUMMARY.

2.  In December, Dushanbe newspapers published an attack on

ABA/CEELI's law and rights program for high school students,

alleging that it was part of a "color revolution" plot to

undermine authority and turn students against their parents.

The Ambassador responded with a letter to the editor setting the

record straight.  That letter prompted an op-ed from a local

lawyer and occasional journalist, Dmitriy Juravlev, attacking

U.S. foreign policy on democracy and on other issues.  It was

clear Juravlev was not recycling government talking points, but

was making a reasonably good-faith effort to understand U.S.

policy in a badly distorted information environment.  In his

reply to Juravlev, the Ambassador invited him to meet and

discuss his ideas.

3.  Juravlev and the Ambassador met March 2 for 90 minutes.  In

his early 30s, Juravlev was graduated from the Tajik Pedagogical

University and the Russian Legal Academy in Moscow.  He worked

for two and a half years in the Tajik presidential apparat

covering human rights, disarmament, and foreign policy issues.

He left when a new boss came in and is currently the assistant

manager of the Tajik Nitrogen Plant in Yovon, Khatlon Oblast.

4.  Juravlev is no dummy.  We report his views as an example of

what U.S. public diplomacy is up against on the reasonably

well-educated street.  His questions and views included the

following:

-- Why is the United States really involved in a remote country

like Tajikistan?  What is your real motive?

-- Other countries like Russia and Iran are investing in

Tajikistan.  Why does the United States refuse to invest?

-- Didn't you invade Iraq and aren't you preparing to invade

Iran so that you can control their oil and deny access to it by

China and India so that their economies won't grow and threaten

U.S. global dominance?

-- Your military has occupied Afghanistan for four years, but

heroin production continues to burgeon.  Aren't you really

colluding with the Afghan government to poison Russia with

heroin to weaken Moscow?

-- Why are you building the [Pyanzh River] bridge and promoting

road-building and other infrastructure projects?  Don't you

really have military goals in mind?

5.  The Ambassador responded candidly and at length to each

question, explaining U.S. views and goals.  At the end, Juravlev

replied, "I know all that.  I've read all your speeches and

interviews," implying that a U.S. official's views are

unreliable simply because they are official.

6.  COMMENT:  By Tajik standards, Juravlev is well-educated,

well-spoken, and not ill-informed, considering the information

to which he has access.  In post-Soviet Tajikistan, people like

him gain their understanding of the world largely from Russian

broadcast and print media.  Each of Juravlev's allegations has

appeared in Russian media here.  While we will add Juravlev to

DUSHANBE 00000443  002.2 OF 002

our distribution list and invite him to appropriate programs,

there are thousands and thousands more Juravlevs that we can't

reach in person.  This would seem to argue for the kind of

independent Russian-language broadcasting proposed reftel, "The

CIS Needs a CNN Russian Language Service."  END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 55499

date: 3/7/2006 3:46

refid: 06DUSHANBE447

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: UNCLASSIFIED

destination: 05DUSHANBE2014

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RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8778 PRIORITY

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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1317

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0539

RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0034

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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1009

RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0029

RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8022

----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000447

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KPAO, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIK STUDENTS DEMAND APOLOGY FROM EMBASSY OVER 2004 HUMAN

RIGHTS REPORT

REF: 05 DUSHANBE 2014

1.  Students from Tajikistan's Technological University

published an open letter March 2 criticizing by name an Embassy

Public Affairs Section FSN for distributing the State

Department's 2004 Human Rights Report on Tajikistan.   The

students charge the report with being slanderous and inaccurate.

 They said the report does not give enough attention to positive

steps Tajikistan has made towards improving human rights.  They

fear the publication and distribution of such "black

information" undermines Tajikistan's international reputation.

Claiming the employee offended the Tajik people's dignity, and

motivated by patriotism, the students demanded an apology from

the Embassy employee to the students and the Tajik government.

Two newspapers have published this open letter so far.

2.  During a human rights roundtable at Tajik Technological

University December 12, EmbOffs distributed Russian-language

copies of last year's Human Rights Report on Tajikistan and

engaged students in a two-hour conversation (ref).  Prior to

December 12, the government purposely tried to block EmbOffs

from holding the roundtable.  Post originally approached the

Russian-government-sponsored Russian-Tajik Slavonic University

to host a discussion on human rights.  When the Russian Embassy

vetoed that plan, Post asked Tajik Technological University, but

was refused by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  After the

Embassy hand-delivered a diplomatic note to the president's

adviser, the government finally relented at the last minute and

allowed EmbOffs to speak with students at the Technological

University.

3.  COMMENT:  Given the government's original disproval of the

human rights discussion with students, post suspects the

government had a hand in the open letter, although it was

attributed to the students.  The letter is an attempt to

discredit the Human Rights Report-the 2005 version is slated for

a March 8 release.   Post will send the media a response letter

from the Ambassador.   END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 55880

date: 3/9/2006 10:24

refid: 06DUSHANBE464

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

destination: 06DUSHANBE464

header:

VZCZCXRO3235

RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG

DE RUEHDBU #0464/01 0681024

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 091024Z MAR 06

FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6925

INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1459

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1424

RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1470

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE

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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0803

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1229

RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8047

----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000464

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN; TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN; COMMERCE FOR PHILIP DE

LEON AND DANICA STARKS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EINV, CH, TI

SUBJECT: U.S. GETS BUSY SIGNAL FROM TAJIK TELECOM

DUSHANBE 00000464  001.2 OF 002

1.  SUMMARY:  Despite the striking success of Indigo, a

U.S.-Tajik cellular service joint venture, China has taken the

lead in developing Tajikistan's telecom sector.  Meetings with

Tajikistan's key telecom decision makers highlighted the growing

role of China and the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD), the lack of real regulation and the pitfalls

of letting the government control international connectivity.

The United States can play an important role in providing

technical guidance and assistance, but may end up taking a back

seat to other investors in the infrastructure projects.  END

SUMMARY.

CHINA TAKING LEAD IN TELECOM

2.  "Things have changed a lot in

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