id: 672
date: 8/8/1994 3:22
refid: 94DUSHANBE2006
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 94DUSHANBE2003|94MOSCOW22287
header:
O 080322Z AUG 94
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4134
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1075
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1079
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 02006
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EUR/ISCA;
USMISSION USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE;
MOSCOW FOR POL (PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR ESCUDERO)
WARSAW FOR JACK ZETKULIK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: GOV, PREL, PINR, PHUM, TI, RS
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER ABDULLAJANOV NOMINATED FOR
PRESIDENT IN WHAT IS SHAPING UP AS A REAL HORSERACE
REF: A) MOSCOW 22287, B) DUSHANBE 2003,
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE LENINABAD REGION HAS OVERWHELMINGLY NOMINATED
FORMER PRIME MINISTER ABDULLAJANOV FOR PRESIDENT. HE JOINS
PARLIAMENT CHAIRMAN RAHMONOV IN THE RACE WHICH WILL BE DECIDED IN
THE SEPTEMBER 25 ELECTION. ABDULLAJANOV, WHO SERVED BOTH THE
OPPOSITION AND THE RAHMONOV GOVERNMENTS AS PRIME MINISTER,
EMERGES AS A VERY STRONG CANDIDATE, POSSIBLY THE INITIAL
FAVORITE. OPPOSITIONISTS' PUBLIC CONCERNS/THREATS REGARDING THE
CONSEQUENCES OF A ONE-MAN RACE APPEAR MOLLIFIED. WE SEE
ABDULAJANOV LIKELY TO CAPITALIZE ON BROAD DISSATISFACTION WITH
THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS BEEN UNABLE TO STOP THE SLIDE
INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS AND IS WIDELY RESENTED FOR ITS CORRUPTION AND
HEAVY HANDEDNESS. PUBLIC CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AGAINST
ABDULAJANOV WILL UNDERMINE HIS CAMPAIGN AS WELL, HOWEVER. THIS
IS A HIGH STAKES RACE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE LIKELY TO PULL OUT
ALL STOPS. INTERNATIONAL MONITORING COULD BE DECISIVE IN
DETERMINING WHETHER TAJIKISTAN'S VOTERS HAVE A CHANCE TO CAST
THEIR VOTES IN A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. END SUMMARY
3. THE LENINABAD REGIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN SPECIAL SESSION
AUGUST 6 NOMINATED ABDULMALIK ABDULAJANOV, FORMER PRIME MINISTER
AND CURRENTLY TAJIKISTAN'S AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, AS THE REGION'S
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE. HE JOINS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
(AND CURRENTLY CHIEF OF STATE) EMOMALI RAHMONOV IN THE RACE FOR
PRESIDENT TO BE DECIDED IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS SEPTEMBER 25 (REFS
A AND B).
4. THE KEENLY WATCHED LENINABAD SESSION PRODUCED THREE
CANDIDATES FOR THE REGIONAL NOMINATION: ABDULAJANOV, RAHMONOV AND
A PROMINENT UZBEK BUSINESSMAN FROM KANIBODAM DISTRICT (YUSUFJON
AHMADOV). AHMADOV IMMEDIATELY WITHDREW HIS NAME FROM
CONSIDERATION SETTING UP A HEAD-TO-HEAD CONFRONTATION BETWEEN
RAHMONOV AND ABDULLAJANOV. IN A SECRET BALLOT, ABDULAJANOV WAS
THE EASY WINNER COLLECTING 137 VOTES TO RAHMONOV'S 33. GOTI
CENTRAL MEDIA REPORTED THE LENINABAD ASSEMBLY RESULT ONE DAY
AFTER THE ACTION BUT OMITED THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A HEAD
TO HEAD CONTEST BETWEEN ABDULLAJANOV AND RAHMONOV AND THAT THE
ABDULLAJANOV HAD BEEN AS DECISIVE AS IT WAS.
5. THE LENINABAD ACTION CAME IN THE WAKE OF THE NOMINATION OF
RAHMONOV BY THE KHATLON REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AND BY THE NATIONAL
YOUTH FEDERATION (REF B). BOTH BODIES HAD SENT FORMAL MESSAGES
TO THE LENINABAD REGIONAL SESSION URGING THAT IT JOIN IN A
CONSENSUS ENDORSEMENT OF RAHMONOV.
6. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO OPPOSITION REACTION TO ABDULAJANOV'S
NOMINATION, STATEMENTS ON THE EVE OF THE LENINABAD NOMINATION HAD
INCLUDED WARNINGS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A ONE-MAN RACE FOR
PRESIDENT. LEADER OF TAJIKISTAN'S REFUGEE ORGANIZATION IN MOSCOW
AND OPPOSITIONIST HABIB SANGINOV WAS QUOTED ON RADIO KHORASAN
(IRAN) AS HAVING STATED THAT IF RAHMONOV EMERGED AS THE ONLY
CANDIDATE, THE SEPTEMBER 25 VOTE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE A
REAL ELECTION. OPPOSITION COMMANDER REDZUAN IN THE SAME
BROADCAST WAS QUOTED AS STATING THAT IF RAHMONOV WERE THE ONLY
NOMINEE THEN THE OPPOSITION WOULD CAST ITS VOTE WITH ROCKETS.
THERE WILL BE MUCH ATTENTION PAID TO THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL
OPPOSITION REACTION TO THE NOMINATION OF ABDULAJANOV, WHO WAS
PRIME MINISTER IN THE BRIEF OPPOSITION GOVERNMENT (SEPTEMBER-
NOVEMBER 1992) AS WELL AS PRIME MINISTER UNDER RAHMONOV (NOVEMBER
1992 - DECEMBER 1993). (ABDULAJANOV WAS ALSO MINISTER OF BREAD
AND BRIEFLY PRIME MINISTER UNDER TAJIKISTAN'S FIRST ELECTED
PRESIDENT, RAHMON NABIYEV.)
7. STILL TO COME ARE POSSIBLE NOMINATIONS BY THE GORNO
BADAKHSHAN AUTONOMOUS REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AS WELL AS POSSIBLE
ACTION BY DUSHANBE AND OTHER DISTRICTS IN THE HISSAR AND GARM
VALLEYS. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE NEW POLITICAL PARTY, "THE
PARTY FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL," AS WELL AS THE
NATIONAL LABOR FEDERATION MAY NOMINATE OTHER CANDIDATES ALTHOUGH
AT THIS POINT THAT APPEARS UNLIKELY. RATHER, IF THEY NINATE
ANYONE AT ALL, THEY WOULD LIKELY LINE UP BEHIND ABDULAJANOV OR
RAHMONOV. THE LABOR FEDERATION, DOMINATED BY KULYABIS, WILL
ALMOST CERTAINLY BACK RAHMONOV.
8. COMMENT/ANALYSIS: WITH ABDULAJANOV IN THE CONTEST, THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES A REAL HORSE RACE.
WE ESTIMATE THAT ABDULAJANOV CAN COUNT ON STRONG SUPPORT IN HIS
HOME REGION OF LENINABAD, AND AMONG TAJIKISTAN'S UZBEK COMMUNITY
WHICH MAKES UP APPROXIMATELY 24 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. OTHER
MINORITIES WILL LIKELY ALSO BACK ABDULAJANOV. THE FORMER
OPPOSITION HOMELANDS IN THE GARM VALLEY, GORNO BADAKHSHAN AND THE
GARM AND PAMIRI COMMUNITIES IN FORMER KURGAN TYUBE REGION WOULD
ALMOST CERTAINLY PREFER ABDULAJANOV TO RAHMONOV -- IF THEY CHOOSE
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO LEAVE ONLY
THE LESS THAN UNITED KULYAB CLAN AS CLEARLY IN RAHMONOV'S COLUMN.
MOREOVER, THE RAPID SLIDE INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS ENTAILING UNPAID
SALARIES AND PENSIONS AND CURRENCY SHORTAGES WILL INEVITABLY CUT
DEEPLY INTO ANY PRO-RAHMONOV VOTE. ON THE FACE OF IT, IT WOULD
APPEAR THAT ABDULAJANOV EMERGES AS THE EARLY FAVORITE IN THE
RACE.
9. SEVERAL ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS MAY INTRUDE, HOWEVER.
THE CIVIL WAR OF 1992 BEGAN AS A NORTH-SOUTH CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE GARM/PAMIRI REGIONS AND THE NORTHERN (LENINABAD)
REGION. THE LENINABAD POLITICAL LEADERSHIP DREW THE KULYABIS INTO
THE STRUGGLE TRANSFORMING IT INTO A SOUTH-SOUTH CONFLICT WITH
LENINABAD ON THE SIDELINES. RECENTLY, GROWING ANIMOSITY BETWEEN
KULYABIS AND UZBEKS HAD SEEMED TO BE PROVIDING THE BASIS FOR A
RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KULYABIS AND GARMIS, NOTABLY IN THE FORMER
KURGAN TYUBE REGION AS POST HAS REPORTED (SEE DUSHANBE 1563).
HOWEVER, RECENT VERY HEAVY FIGHTING IN TAVILDARA DISTRICT HAS LED
TO NEW TENSIONS BETWEEN GARMIS AND KULYABIS (SEPTEL).
10. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE HIGH STAKES INVOLVED IN THIS
RACE, MAKE IT LIKELY THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE PREPARED TO USE
WHATEVER MEANS ARE NECESSARY TO SECURE VICTORY. PHYSICAL
INTIMIDATION (OR WORSE) TARGETING CANDIDATES, CAMPAIGN WORKERS
AND VOTERS CAN NOT BE RULED OUT. RAHMONNOV'S ABILITY TO CONTROL
THE MEDIA FOR HIS PURPOSES IS LIKELY TO BE EXPLOITED. ALREADY
HEROIC DESCRIPTIONS OF RAHMONOV AND SCANDAL MONGERING ATTACKS ON
ABDULAJANOV HAVE APPEARED IN THE GOTI CONTROLLED MEDIA. THE
PUBLISHER OF THE PRO-ABDULAJANOV WEEKLY "TOJIKISTON"
HAS TOLD HIS EDITOR THAT FOR TWO MONTHS THE PAPER WILL NOT
PUBLISH. HE EXPLAINED THAT IF THE PAPER TAKES A PRO-ABDULAJANOV
POSTURE THE STAFF WILL BE AT RISK. HOWEVER, THE PAPER WILL NOT
SUBMIT TO PRESSURE TO BECOME A RAHMONOV MOUTHPIECE.
11. FINALLY, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INTERESTS IS AS YET AN UNKNOWN.
A LENGTHY PAEAN TO RAHMONOV BY RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SINKEVICH ON
NATIONAL TELEVISION AUGUST 7 PRESUMABLY DOES NOT SIGNAL A PRO-
RAHMONOV TILT BY THE RUSSIANS -- WHOM WE EXPECT TO BE EITHER
QUIETLY PRO-ABDULAJANOV OR NEUTRAL. BOTH UZBEKISTAN AND RUSSIA
HAVE THE ABILITY TO TURN THE ECONOMIC SCREWS ON TAJIKSITAN -- OR
MAKE THINGS EASIER, TO INFLUENCE VOTES. WE NOTE MOSCOW RADIO
COMMENTARY AUGUST 7 DESCRIBED ABDULLAJANOV AS LIKELY TO GET MOST
OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY VOTE AS HE HAD CHAMPIONED BOTH USE OF
RUSSIAN AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP FOR RUSSIANS
LIVING IN TAJIKISTAN.
12. THE ONLY ASSESSMENT THAT CAN BE MADE WITH CONFIDENCE AT THIS
POINT IS THAT IT APPEARS THAT THERE WILL BE A HARD FOUGHT CONTEST
FOR PRESIDENT. INTERNATIONAL MONITORING WILL BE CRITICAL IF
THERE IS TO BE ANY REALISTIC HOPE THAT THE VOTERS WILL HAVE A
CHANCE OF MAKING A FREE AND FAIR CHOICE.
MCWILLIAMS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 1035
date: 12/21/1999 9:27
refid: 99ALMATY12359
origin: US Office Almaty
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
R 210927Z DEC 99
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6195
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//DIA REP/CCJ2-JCH/CCJ5//
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J2/J5//
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 012359
FROM EMBASSY DUSHANBE
DEPT FOR S/NIS - BEYRLE AND WILSON, EUR/CACEN -
BOND AND LEVINE
DEPT ALSO FOR INR/B
E.O. 12958: DECL I2/20/09
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: SCENES FROM A BACK-ROOM
RESHUFFLE
REF: FBIS RESTON VA 200804Z DEC 99
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DOUGLAS B. KENT FOR REASON
1.5 (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. PRESIDENT RAHMONOV IS
RESHUFFLINQ HIS CABINET. A CABINET INSIDER
DESCRIBED TO US HOW RAHMONOV, TRUE TO CHARACTER,
IS DOING THIS IN A WAY THAT MAXIMIZES THE
HUMILIATION OF EVERYONE INVOLVED. HIS CHOICE FOR
PRIME MINISTER, THE RELATIVELY UNKNOWN AND
UNINFLUENTIAL OQIL OQILOV, WAS A SURPRISE TO MANY.
SOME SPECULATE THAT RAHMONOV'S MAIN INTEREST WAS
IN APPOINTINQ SOMEONE WHO HASN'T MADE TOO MUCH
MONEY WORKINQ IN THE GOTI. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) GENERAL HABIB SANQINOV, DEPUTY MINISTER OF
INTERIOR IN THE GOTI, SUMMONED EMBASSY SENIOR FSN
DECEMBER 14 TO DISCUSS HIS VIEWS OF PRESIDENT
RAHMONOV'S PLANS FOR RESHUFFLINQ HIS CABINET --
PLANS THAT LED TO THE DECEMBER 20 APPOINTMENT OF
OQIL OQILOV AS THE NEW PRIME MINISTER (REFTEL).
3. (C) SANQINOV DESCRIBED A MEETINQ RAHMONOV HAD
CALLED OF HIS SENIOR DEPUTIES ON OECEMBER 12.
STARTINQ WITH THEN-PRIME MINISTER YAHYO AZIMOV,
RAHMONOV BEQAN TO DISCUSS THE RESHUFFLE'S
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM. PHYSICALLY CARESSINQ
AZIMOV TO MAXIMIZE THE MAN'S HUMILIATION, RAHMONOV
TOLD AZIMOV HE WOULD NOT BE LEFT WITHOUT A
POSITION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT (COMMENT: WHAT
THAT WOULD BE, RAHMONOV DID NOT SAY, BUT IT MUST
HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO EVERYONE PRESENT THAT THE PRIME
MINISTER'S JOB WAS NOT WHAT RAHMONOV HAD IN MIND).
4. (C) RAHMONOV THEN ADDRESSED, ONE BY ONE, HIS
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, MINISTERS, AND COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN. RAHMONOV ENCOURAQED SOME, LIKE DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER ABDURAHMON AZIMOV, TO RUN IN
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR. HE TOLD
OTHERS, LIKE BASQUL DODIKHUDOEVA, THAT HE WOULD
FIND SOME SORT OF POSITION IN THE NEXT QOVERNMENT
FOR THEM, ALTHOUQH HE AVOIDED PROMISINQ ANYTHINQ
SPECIFIC. HE HAD NO SUQGESTIONS FOR SOME OTHERS,
SUCH AS ISMAT ESHMIRZOEV -- ALL THEY LEARNED WAS
THAT THEY WOULD SOON BE OUT OF A JOB. OEPUTY
PRIME MINISTERS TURAJONZADA, VAZIROV, AND RASULOV
-- WHO HAVE BEEN IN OFFICE FOR LESS TIME THAN THE
OTHERS -- WILL STAY ON IN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS.
5. (C) RAHMONOV TOLD HIS CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION,
MAHMADNAZAR SALIHOV, TO CONSIDER RUNNINQ FOR A
SEAT IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT. SALIHOV -- TRUE TO
HIS NICKNAME, "MR. STUBBORN" -- OBJECTED.
RAHMONOV REBUKED HIM, RESPONDING THAT "WE WILL
WAIT AND SEE WHETHER YOU WILL AQREE TO DO SO OR
NOT." ACCORDINQ TO SANQINOV, THE MEETINQ LEFT THE
FATE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY
AMIRKUL AZIMOV UNKNOWN (NOTE: AZIMOV SERVES AS
RAHMONOV'S TROUBLE-SHOOTER, MOST RECENTLY DURINQ
THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF
UZBEKISTAN QUERILLA FORCE OPERATINQ ON
TAJIKISTAN'S TERRITORY AND SEIZINQ KYRQYZ AND
JAPANESE HOSTAQES IN KYRQYZSTAN.)
6. (C) ALSO DISCUSSED AT THE MEETINQ WERE
RAHMONOV'S POLITICAL OPPONENTS. SANQINOV
DESCRIBED A VINDICTIVE RAHMONOV RAILINQ AQAINST
HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIQN OPPONENT, OAVLAT USMON,
AND HIS WOULD-BE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIQN OPPONENTS,
SULTAN QUVVATOV AND SEYFIDDIN TURAYEV. RAHMONOV
SAID HE PLANNED TO "PURSUE" TURAYEV (COMMENT:
PROBABLY THE MOST POPULAR OF THE THREE) TO THE
POINT WHERE TURAYEV LEFT THE COUNTRY. (COMMENT:
RAHMONOV NEVER MAKES PEACE WITH HIS RIVALS --
ABDUMALIK ABDULLAJANOV, WHO FLED TO UZBEKISTAN, IS
ANOTHER CASE IN POINT).
NEW PRIME MINISTER'S BIODATA
---------------------------
7. (C) OQIL OQILOV (ALTERNATIVE SPELLINQ: AKIL
AKILOV) WAS BORN IN 1944 IN KHOJAND, LENINABAD
REQION (THE NORTHERN PART OF TAJIKISTAN). AFTER
QRADUATINQ IN CONSTRUCTION ENQINEERINQ FROM A
MOSCOW INSTITUTE, HE WORKED AS A KHOJAND CITY
GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION OFFICIAL, EVENTUALLY
BECOMINQ MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION IN THE
QOVERNMENT OF THE THEN-TAJIK S.S.R. HE REMAINED
IN THE QOVERNMENT THROUQH INDEPENDENCE AND THE
CIVIL WAR. RAHMONOV APPOINTED HIM DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER IN LATE 1994. HE SERVED IN THIS POSITION
UNTIL RAHMONOV SENT HIM PACKINQ IN 1997. HE
RETURNED TO KHOJAND, WHERE HE WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN OF THE REQIONAL HUKUMAT (GOVERNMENT).
COMMENT
-------
8. (C) OQILOV'S APPOINTMENT COMES AS A SURPRISE -
- HE IS CONSIDERABLY LESS WELL-KNOW AND LESS
INFLUENTIAL THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO
WERE APPARENTLY IN THE RUNNINQ, SUCH AS DUSHANBE
MAYOR AND RAHMONOV CONFIDANT MAHMADSAID
UBAIDULLOEV. LIKE HIS PREDECESSOR, AZIMOV, HE IS
A NORTHERNER, AND HIS REGIONAL IDENTITY PROBABLY
PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN HIS SELECTION, WITH
RAHMONOV KEEPINQ HIS BASE OF SUPPORT BROADER THAN
HIS NATIVE KULYAB REQION IN THE SOUTH.
9. (C) SOME OBSERVERS SPECULATE THAT OQILOV'S
BEINQ OUT OF POWER, AND OUT OF THE CAPITAL, FOR AN
EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME PLAYED IN HIS FAVOR.
RAHMONOV, THEY SAY, WANTED TO APPOINT SOMEONE WHO
HAD NOT MADE AS MUCH MONEY IN QOVERNMENT AS HIS
CURRENT CABINET MEMBERS. TO ILLUSTRATE THE BANDIT
CULTURE PREVAILINQ IN THE RAHMONOV REQIME,
SANQINOV TOLD EMBASSY SENIOR FSN OF A RECENT VISIT
TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABDURAHMON AZIMOV'S
OFFICE. AS THEY WERE TALKINQ, A TELEPHONE CALL
FROM PRIME MINISTER YAHYO AZIMOV CAME THROUQH. IN
FRONT OF SANQINOV, ABDURAHMON AZIMOV COMPLAINED TO
THE PRIME MINISTER THAT "YOU HAVE BOUQHT ALMOST
HALF OF KHOJAND AND HAVE ENOUQH TO LIVE ON. I
HAVE NOT QOT ANYTHINQ BEHIND ME AND HAVE NO
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE!"
KENT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 13659
date: 2/1/2004 5:20
refid: 04DUSHANBE170
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 04DUSHANBE146|04DUSHANBE2|04DUSHANBE90
header:
P R 010520Z FEB 04
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1282
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
CIA WASHDC
CIS COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
ISLAMABAD PK
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
NSC WASHDC
USMISSION OSCE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION US UN NEW YORK NY
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
USMISSION USEU BRUSSELS
RUFGTCC USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GR
USMISSION USNATO
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000170
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN - BANKS, DRL
MOSCOW FOR WOOSTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/09
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, KISL, KDEM, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: ISLAMIC PARTY'S KABIRI UNPLUGGED
REF: (A) DUSHANBE 146; (B) DUSHANBE 90; (C) DUSHANBE 02
CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD HOAGLAND, AMB, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.5 (D)
1. (C) Summary: At a small dinner party on January 29, First
Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Revival Party Muhiddin Kabiri
freely discussed the upcoming elections and his party's chances
of success. Drawing on his experiences in the last
parliamentary elections, he opined that President Rahmonov would
ensure that his party retains power by any means possible.
Kabiri said that Rahmonov retains popularity, but the next
generation of voters will look for concrete economic
achievements before casting their votes for him. Kabiri, like
his party, looks to the 2010 parliamentary elections as the
target date for possible change. End summary.
2. (C) DCM participated on January 29 in a small dinner hosted
by a German Embassy colleague whose featured guest was Muhiddin
Kabiri, the first deputy chairman of the Islamic Revival Party
of Tajikistan (IRPT). Arriving in his newly acquired Mercedes
Benz 500 series sedan, and more nattily attired than the rest of
the guests, Kabiri declined offers of wine and champagne and
settled for downing three or four beers during his stay of five
and one-half hours. Over a tasty Persian meal of fessenjun,
coo-coo, and mastakhiar, Kabiri discussed the upcoming
elections, the role of the IRPT in Tajikistan, and his own
political ambitions.
3. (C) Kabiri said that the 2005 parliamentary election would
not result in any change of power. Referring to his own
parliamentary campaign in Faizobad during the last election in
2000, Kabiri said that after the first round of voting he was
the front-runner with 48% of the vote. Though he had the
support of all the other opposition candidates for the second
round, his votes totaled only 48.5%, and the candidate from the
President's party, the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(PDPT), won.
4. (C) Kabiri said that after the first round results were in,
some government officials approached him and suggested that he
take the post of ambassador to Iran or to Turkey rather than
continue a fruitless campaign to enter parliament. He was
specifically told that he had no chance to win the election.
Kabiri demurred, though he knew the government would not allow
him to win a seat in parliament. A good friend who was leader
of one of the small municipalities told Kabiri that President
Rahmonov had called him in and ordered him to make sure that
Kabiri did not win. Kabiri's friend told him that "I had no
choice but to do the President's bidding, but because of our
friendship I want you to know what happened."
5. (C) In discussing the upcoming elections, Kabiri said that
the IRPT had a long-term outlook. (See Ref A) Realistically
speaking, Kabiri said, the IRPT would not win even if the next
election were fair and transparent. (He hastened to add,
however, that this would not/not be the case.) The IRPT is
looking to the next parliamentary election -- in 2010 -- as the
one when a viable alternative to Rahmonov could emerge. This
would be the first election in which the post-civil war
generation would participate, and their desire for increased
economic opportunities would not be flavored by the desire for
stability that overrides any democratic tendencies in most of
the present electorate. Nonetheless, the President is flexing
his muscles and chipping away at the IRPT with the recent arrest
of Shamsiddinov (Ref B).
6. (C) President Rahmonov, according to Kabiri, already has
started his campaign for parliamentary elections. By
intimidating independent media, Rahmonov wants to ensure that
not much light is shined on his election tactics. (Ref C) And,
Kabiri averred, Rahmonov plans to subvert the international
community's urging to reform the current election law by "taking
over" the process. Once he -- via the PDPT's control of
parliament -- brings a draft election law before parliament, any
reforms will only be to increase the President's hold on power.
7. (C) Kabiri readily admits that Rahmonov himself is popular
with the electorate. In a private and confidential poll
conducted by the IRPT, Rahmonov was the favorite for almost half
of those polled. The second leading candidate -- who Kabiri
would not name -- had support from 11% of those polled, and
Nuri, the leader of the IRPT, garnered 8%.
8. (C) Regarding the future of the IRPT, Kabiri said that it is
considering changing its name, perhaps removing "Islam" from it.
Nuri decided that it might be time to do so and discussed this
with the President. Rahmonov told him that it would not be a
good idea at the present time, and Kabiri characterized
Rahmonov's reasoning as Machiavellian -- the President likes to
hold up the IRPT to foreign visitors as the only legal Islamic
party in Central Asia and wants to raise the specter of an
Islamic "Taliban style" party to the electorate. Kabiri also
said that Nuri was ready to leave the leadership of the party
and turn it over to him, but Kabiri said he was not yet ready to
assume this position.
9. (C) In fact, Kabiri said he was prepared to support a
candidate for president from any of the opposition parties, if
only there were a viable candidate. The only person who Kabiri
believes could measure up is Rahmatullo Zoirov, leader of the
Social Democrat Party of Tajikistan. But as Kabiri said he told
Zoirov, "if only you were Tajik, you could be president."
(Zoirov is an ethnic Uzbek.)
10. (C) Bio note: Kabiri was open and frank in his assessments
and commented how much he enjoyed the discussion. Unlike most
Tajik politicians, he relishes hard questions, and he answered
them thoughtfully. He spoke in Tajiki and English, and although
he clearly preferred Tajiki, his English language skills were
more than adequate. He obtained his new Mercedes only two weeks
ago. He owns a company that imports Russian cars and cranes,
selling many of them in Afghanistan. One Afghan customer could
not pay for the delivery of a crane and gave Kabiri the Mercedes
instead. It's likely that Kabiri will sell the car soon rather
than risk trying to service it in Dushanbe -- the closest
Mercedes Benz dealer is thousands of miles away.
11. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 13965
date: 2/13/2004 15:39
refid: 04BRUSSELS666
origin: Embassy Brussels
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000666
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KZ, KG, TI, TX, UZ, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: US-EU COEST CONSULTATIONS PART 1: CENTRAL ASIA
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 9 in Brussels, EUR DAS Lynn
Pascoe -- accompanied by EUR/ACE Deputy Dan Rosenblum and
EUR/ERA Director Kathy Allegrone -- discussed US-EU
cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus with the
EU's COEST Troika. This cable covers the Central Asia
portion of the consultations. The South Caucasus portion
will be reported septel.
-- Kazakhstan: Country remains relative bright spot in
region, but still needs outside pressure to continue reforms;
immediate priority is for US and EU to coordinate closely on
the ground during run up to parliamentary elections.
-- Uzbekistan: EU shares US concerns about new NGO
registration procedures; EU considering how to respond to
UNHRC resolution; wants to be firm on HR without pushing
Karimov away.
-- Kyrgyzstan: EU is pleased with Kyrgyzstan's extension of
death penalty moratorium, but sees progress on new election
code as insufficient; new Commission office in Bishkek will
provide opportunity for enhanced US-EU pre-election
coordination.
-- Tajikistan: Commission soon to open office in Dushanbe;
will emphasize border controls and counternarcotics in
upgraded dialogue with Tajikistan.
-- Chinese Policies: EU keen to hear US views on Chinese
regional policies; glad to learn US views them as generally
non-threatening with regard to Central Asia. END SUMMARY.
Regional Comments
-----------------
2. (SBU) Irish Presidency rep Barbara Jones said she had
recently met with the Russian Ambassador to the OSCE in
Vienna, who did not see the US/EU/OSCE as having a role to
play in the democratization of the region. Jones concluded
from this that much of the U.S. and EU effort would therefore
be bilateral, as Russia would limit the OSCE's role in the
region. Commission Central Asia and Caucasus Director Kurt
Juul said he has noted increased Russian and Chinese interest
in Central Asia; the EU will continue its focus on regional
programs but the challenge is for the countries of Central
Asia to take concrete steps on political and economic
reforms. Commissioner Patten plans to visit Central Asia in
March. Since the last COEST Troika, Juul said that the EU
has initialed a partnership and Cooperation Agreement with
Tajikistan.
Turkmenistan
------------
3. (SBU) Juul said the EU has noted an increased desire on
the part of Turkmenistan for a dialogue with the EC.
Following the EU's recent formal trade and cooperation
meeting with the Turkmen, an informal discussion was held
that included an extensive review of human rights issues.
The EU, Juul said, was encouraged and is prepared to test the
waters with Ashgabat and engage the Turkmen further.
Kazakhstan
----------
4. (SBU) Juul termed events in Kazakhstan as reflecting an
increasingly "normal" development, with some positive
movement on human rights issues. He said that European
companies remain excited about the business potential of
Kazakhstan,s increasing role as a major energy supplier.
While serious concerns about the business environment
persist, European companies seemed committed to continuing
their engagement with the GOK, he said. Juul noted that
Russian companies also seemed increasingly interested in
investing in the Kazakh private sector.
Pascoe agreed that Kazakhstan,s energy assets and early
reform efforts pointed toward a brighter future than most of
its neighbors, but cautioned that we should continue pressing
Nazarbayev to consolidate the positive changes and follow
through on his reform commitments. Jones pointed out that
Nazarbayev,s apparent effort to crown his daughter for
presidential succession did not bode well for ongoing
political reforms. Pascoe agreed that it bore watching, but
noted that Kazakhstan had a large pool of competent
progressive officials who would work for progress. The
immediate priority, he said, was for the US and EU to
coordinate closely on the ground during the run up to
parliamentary elections to ensure a positive pre-election
environment and broader political representation in the new
parliament. Jones emphatically agreed, and said she would
push for the same kind of close coordination that we have
benefited from in Ukraine. She would also support a
Brussels-Washington link if it helped with coordination on
the ground, but noted that field coordination would, as
usual, be most fruitful.
Uzbekistan
----------
5. (SBU) The EU agreed with Pascoe that Uzbekistan posed a
particular challenge because on the one hand it remains a
notable human rights violator while on the other it continues
to make progress ) albeit grudging and halting ) on
political reform. Uzbekistan has not strayed from its
determination to do just enough to keep the West off its
back. Karimov had yet to realize that political and economic
reform was necessary for Uzbekistan,s development, Pascoe
said. Yet firm pressure works in Central Asia, Juul
observed, and should be maintained; but we must also be
careful to recognize the positive steps as they are taken.
Both sides agreed that the key challenge was to maintain a
firm line with Karimov while also not pushing him away from
the table.
6. (SBU) Jones said the EU shared US concerns about
Tashkent,s new NGO policy, and did not accept FM Safayev,s
explanation that the transfer of NGO monitoring authority
from the Foreign to the Interior Ministry was a technical
shift only. Irish COEST Deputy Chair Peter McIver said that
Safayev told the EU at Cooperation Council meeting on January
27 that the government made the change because the Foreign
Ministry could only assign one staffer to the NGO office,
while the Interior Ministry had more resources and could thus
do a better job. The EU found the assertion laughable, Jones
said, but their overall impression of Safayev had been
positive. The Council Secretariat,s Michael Swann said that
Human Rights Watch (HRW) had visited his office the day after
the Cooperation Council meetings. HRW claimed that Safayev,
while slick and well-spoken, was no better than the others,
and had been sent because Karimov thought his considerable
charm could woo the West. HRW said it would accuse the EU of
backpeddling if the Conclusions issued by January's meetings
were any softer than those of earlier EU-Uzbekistan meetings.
7. (SBU) Jones said the EU is still discussing how to handle
a resolution on Uzbekistan in the UNHRC this year. The EU
felt bound to call Tashkent on its abuses, but was also keen
not to do anything that might disrupt Uzbekistan's grudging
progress. Pascoe said the US shared the dilemma. He also
noted that Karimov has lately been asking for support on
education reform. Donors should consider how to take
advantage of this opening. Jones said the EU would consider
its options. Jones closed by observing that March and April
would be active months for Uzbekistan, with UNHRC and visits
to the country by the EBRD and Commissioner Patten (March
14). Jones and Pascoe agreed that it would be useful to
regroup and together assess next steps after these events.
Kyrgyzstan
----------
8. (SBU) Dutch Deputy Director Renette van der Waal conveyed
a mixed EU assessment of Kyrgyz progress. The EU was pleased
with Kyrgyzstan's extension of the death penalty moratorium,
but thought that insufficient progress was being made on the
new election code. Juul said the EU would meet with Akayev
in March and would discuss progress on human rights, civil
society and economic reform. Pascoe agreed with the mixed
assessment, but said that the mix leaned more heavily to the
positive side than the negative. Kyrgyzstan is undertaking
some good reforms, he said, but the efforts are hampered by
Kyrgyzstan's poverty and lack of resources and experience.
Jones said she would task the German Embassy (representing EU
interests) and the soon to be opened Commission delegation in
Bishkek to begin coordinating pre-election activities as soon
as possible with the US Embassy.
Tajikistan
----------
9. (SBU) Pascoe said political stability and the drug trade
continued to be Tajikistans' biggest challenges. Our main
push is to help the country to normality. Pascoe also said
the US was pleased that the Commission had decided to open a
delegation in Dushanbe. Juul said the EU's upgraded dialogue
with Tajikistan would emphasize border controls and
counternarcotics. Swann echoed Juul's statement and pointed
out that countering drugs and organized crime was moving up
the EU's international agenda in light of the recently
adopted European Security Strategy.
China,s Central Asia Policy
---------------------------
10. (SBU) Pascoe fielded several questions from Troika
members keen to hear US views on China,s Central Asia
policy. In response, Pascoe said that China,s actions
appeared fairly transparent, and motivated by obvious
security and energy interests. Asked about the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), Pascoe said that the SCO
appeared hobbled by a lack of financial support from anywhere
save Beijing. The US had expressed an interest in observer
status, but neither the Chinese nor the Russians seemed
enthusiastic about this. (COMMENT: The EU did not offer a
view of its own, seeming instead to be in search of
information that would help the EU determine if it should be
concerned about China,s increasing interest in its western
neighborhood. Several Troika members appeared relieved to
learn that the US did not view China,s engagement in Central
Asia, including the SCO, as a major threat. END COMMENT.)
Dushanbe minimize consi
dered.