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05.09.201308:34
Источник изображения: ИА "Авеста"

date: 8/8/1994 3:22

id: 672

date: 8/8/1994 3:22

refid: 94DUSHANBE2006

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination: 94DUSHANBE2003|94MOSCOW22287

header:

O 080322Z AUG 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4134

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1075

DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1079

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 02006

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EUR/ISCA;

USMISSION USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE;

MOSCOW FOR POL (PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR ESCUDERO)

WARSAW FOR JACK ZETKULIK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: GOV, PREL, PINR, PHUM, TI, RS

SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER ABDULLAJANOV NOMINATED FOR

PRESIDENT IN WHAT IS SHAPING UP AS A REAL HORSERACE

REF:  A) MOSCOW 22287, B) DUSHANBE 2003,

1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2.  SUMMARY:  THE LENINABAD REGION HAS OVERWHELMINGLY NOMINATED

FORMER PRIME MINISTER ABDULLAJANOV FOR PRESIDENT. HE JOINS

PARLIAMENT CHAIRMAN RAHMONOV IN THE RACE WHICH WILL BE DECIDED IN

THE SEPTEMBER 25 ELECTION.  ABDULLAJANOV, WHO SERVED BOTH THE

OPPOSITION AND THE RAHMONOV GOVERNMENTS AS PRIME MINISTER,

EMERGES AS A VERY STRONG CANDIDATE, POSSIBLY THE INITIAL

FAVORITE.  OPPOSITIONISTS' PUBLIC CONCERNS/THREATS REGARDING THE

CONSEQUENCES OF A ONE-MAN RACE APPEAR MOLLIFIED.  WE SEE

ABDULAJANOV LIKELY TO CAPITALIZE ON BROAD DISSATISFACTION WITH

THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS BEEN UNABLE TO STOP THE SLIDE

INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS AND IS WIDELY RESENTED FOR ITS CORRUPTION AND

HEAVY HANDEDNESS. PUBLIC CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AGAINST

ABDULAJANOV WILL UNDERMINE HIS CAMPAIGN AS WELL, HOWEVER.  THIS

IS A HIGH STAKES RACE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE LIKELY TO PULL OUT

ALL STOPS.  INTERNATIONAL MONITORING COULD BE DECISIVE IN

DETERMINING WHETHER TAJIKISTAN'S VOTERS HAVE A CHANCE TO CAST

THEIR VOTES IN A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION.  END SUMMARY

3.  THE LENINABAD REGIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN SPECIAL SESSION

AUGUST 6 NOMINATED ABDULMALIK ABDULAJANOV, FORMER PRIME MINISTER

AND CURRENTLY TAJIKISTAN'S AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, AS THE REGION'S

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE.  HE JOINS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

(AND CURRENTLY CHIEF OF STATE) EMOMALI RAHMONOV IN THE RACE FOR

PRESIDENT TO BE DECIDED IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS SEPTEMBER 25 (REFS

A AND B).

4.  THE KEENLY WATCHED LENINABAD SESSION PRODUCED THREE

CANDIDATES FOR THE REGIONAL NOMINATION: ABDULAJANOV, RAHMONOV AND

A PROMINENT UZBEK BUSINESSMAN FROM KANIBODAM DISTRICT (YUSUFJON

AHMADOV). AHMADOV IMMEDIATELY WITHDREW HIS NAME FROM

CONSIDERATION SETTING UP A HEAD-TO-HEAD CONFRONTATION BETWEEN

RAHMONOV AND ABDULLAJANOV.  IN A SECRET BALLOT, ABDULAJANOV WAS

THE EASY WINNER COLLECTING 137 VOTES TO RAHMONOV'S 33. GOTI

CENTRAL MEDIA REPORTED THE LENINABAD ASSEMBLY RESULT ONE DAY

AFTER THE ACTION BUT OMITED THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A HEAD

TO HEAD CONTEST BETWEEN ABDULLAJANOV AND RAHMONOV AND THAT THE

ABDULLAJANOV HAD BEEN AS DECISIVE AS IT WAS.

5.  THE LENINABAD ACTION CAME IN THE WAKE OF THE NOMINATION OF

RAHMONOV BY THE KHATLON REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AND BY THE NATIONAL

YOUTH FEDERATION (REF B).  BOTH BODIES HAD SENT FORMAL MESSAGES

TO THE LENINABAD REGIONAL SESSION URGING THAT IT JOIN IN A

CONSENSUS ENDORSEMENT OF RAHMONOV.

6.  WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO OPPOSITION REACTION TO ABDULAJANOV'S

NOMINATION, STATEMENTS ON THE EVE OF THE LENINABAD NOMINATION HAD

INCLUDED WARNINGS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A ONE-MAN RACE FOR

PRESIDENT.  LEADER OF TAJIKISTAN'S REFUGEE ORGANIZATION IN MOSCOW

AND OPPOSITIONIST HABIB SANGINOV WAS QUOTED ON RADIO KHORASAN

(IRAN) AS HAVING STATED THAT IF RAHMONOV EMERGED AS THE ONLY

CANDIDATE, THE SEPTEMBER 25 VOTE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE A

REAL ELECTION.  OPPOSITION COMMANDER REDZUAN IN THE SAME

BROADCAST WAS QUOTED AS STATING THAT IF RAHMONOV WERE THE ONLY

NOMINEE THEN THE OPPOSITION WOULD CAST ITS VOTE WITH ROCKETS.

THERE WILL BE MUCH ATTENTION PAID TO THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL

OPPOSITION REACTION TO THE NOMINATION OF ABDULAJANOV, WHO WAS

PRIME MINISTER IN THE BRIEF OPPOSITION GOVERNMENT (SEPTEMBER-

NOVEMBER 1992) AS WELL AS PRIME MINISTER UNDER RAHMONOV (NOVEMBER

1992 - DECEMBER 1993).  (ABDULAJANOV WAS ALSO MINISTER OF BREAD

AND BRIEFLY PRIME MINISTER UNDER TAJIKISTAN'S FIRST ELECTED

PRESIDENT, RAHMON NABIYEV.)

7.  STILL TO COME ARE POSSIBLE NOMINATIONS BY THE GORNO

BADAKHSHAN AUTONOMOUS REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AS WELL AS POSSIBLE

ACTION BY DUSHANBE AND OTHER DISTRICTS IN THE HISSAR AND GARM

VALLEYS.  THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE NEW POLITICAL PARTY, "THE

PARTY FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL," AS WELL AS THE

NATIONAL LABOR FEDERATION MAY NOMINATE OTHER CANDIDATES ALTHOUGH

AT THIS POINT THAT APPEARS UNLIKELY. RATHER, IF THEY NINATE

ANYONE AT ALL, THEY WOULD LIKELY LINE UP BEHIND ABDULAJANOV OR

RAHMONOV. THE LABOR FEDERATION, DOMINATED BY KULYABIS, WILL

ALMOST CERTAINLY BACK RAHMONOV.

8.  COMMENT/ANALYSIS:  WITH ABDULAJANOV IN THE CONTEST, THE

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES A REAL HORSE RACE.

WE ESTIMATE THAT ABDULAJANOV CAN COUNT ON STRONG SUPPORT IN HIS

HOME REGION OF LENINABAD, AND AMONG TAJIKISTAN'S UZBEK COMMUNITY

WHICH MAKES UP APPROXIMATELY 24 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION.  OTHER

MINORITIES WILL LIKELY ALSO BACK ABDULAJANOV.  THE FORMER

OPPOSITION HOMELANDS IN THE GARM VALLEY, GORNO BADAKHSHAN AND THE

GARM AND PAMIRI COMMUNITIES IN FORMER KURGAN TYUBE REGION WOULD

ALMOST CERTAINLY PREFER ABDULAJANOV TO RAHMONOV -- IF THEY CHOOSE

TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION.  THIS WOULD APPEAR TO LEAVE ONLY

THE LESS THAN UNITED KULYAB CLAN AS CLEARLY IN RAHMONOV'S COLUMN.

MOREOVER, THE RAPID SLIDE INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS ENTAILING UNPAID

SALARIES AND PENSIONS AND CURRENCY SHORTAGES WILL INEVITABLY CUT

DEEPLY INTO ANY PRO-RAHMONOV VOTE.  ON THE FACE OF IT, IT WOULD

APPEAR THAT ABDULAJANOV EMERGES AS THE EARLY FAVORITE IN THE

RACE.

9.  SEVERAL ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS MAY INTRUDE, HOWEVER.

THE CIVIL WAR OF 1992 BEGAN AS A NORTH-SOUTH CONFRONTATION

BETWEEN THE GARM/PAMIRI REGIONS AND THE NORTHERN (LENINABAD)

REGION. THE LENINABAD POLITICAL LEADERSHIP DREW THE KULYABIS INTO

THE STRUGGLE TRANSFORMING IT INTO A SOUTH-SOUTH CONFLICT WITH

LENINABAD ON THE SIDELINES.  RECENTLY, GROWING ANIMOSITY BETWEEN

KULYABIS AND UZBEKS HAD SEEMED TO BE PROVIDING THE BASIS FOR A

RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KULYABIS AND GARMIS, NOTABLY IN THE FORMER

KURGAN TYUBE REGION AS POST HAS REPORTED (SEE DUSHANBE 1563).

HOWEVER, RECENT VERY HEAVY FIGHTING IN TAVILDARA DISTRICT HAS LED

TO NEW TENSIONS BETWEEN GARMIS AND KULYABIS (SEPTEL).

10.  PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE HIGH STAKES INVOLVED IN THIS

RACE, MAKE IT LIKELY THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE PREPARED TO USE

WHATEVER MEANS ARE NECESSARY TO SECURE VICTORY.  PHYSICAL

INTIMIDATION (OR WORSE) TARGETING CANDIDATES, CAMPAIGN WORKERS

AND VOTERS CAN NOT BE RULED OUT.  RAHMONNOV'S ABILITY TO CONTROL

THE MEDIA FOR HIS PURPOSES IS LIKELY TO BE EXPLOITED.  ALREADY

HEROIC DESCRIPTIONS OF RAHMONOV AND SCANDAL MONGERING ATTACKS ON

ABDULAJANOV HAVE APPEARED IN THE GOTI CONTROLLED MEDIA.  THE

PUBLISHER OF THE PRO-ABDULAJANOV WEEKLY "TOJIKISTON"

HAS TOLD HIS EDITOR THAT FOR TWO MONTHS THE PAPER WILL NOT

PUBLISH.  HE EXPLAINED THAT IF THE PAPER TAKES A PRO-ABDULAJANOV

POSTURE THE STAFF WILL BE AT RISK.  HOWEVER, THE PAPER WILL NOT

SUBMIT TO PRESSURE TO BECOME A RAHMONOV MOUTHPIECE.

11.  FINALLY, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INTERESTS IS AS YET AN UNKNOWN.

A LENGTHY PAEAN TO RAHMONOV BY RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SINKEVICH ON

NATIONAL TELEVISION AUGUST 7 PRESUMABLY DOES NOT SIGNAL A PRO-

RAHMONOV TILT BY THE RUSSIANS -- WHOM WE EXPECT TO BE EITHER

QUIETLY PRO-ABDULAJANOV OR NEUTRAL.  BOTH UZBEKISTAN AND RUSSIA

HAVE THE ABILITY TO TURN THE ECONOMIC SCREWS ON TAJIKSITAN -- OR

MAKE THINGS EASIER, TO INFLUENCE VOTES.  WE NOTE MOSCOW RADIO

COMMENTARY AUGUST 7 DESCRIBED ABDULLAJANOV AS LIKELY TO GET MOST

OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY VOTE AS HE HAD CHAMPIONED BOTH USE OF

RUSSIAN AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP FOR RUSSIANS

LIVING IN TAJIKISTAN.

12.  THE ONLY ASSESSMENT THAT CAN BE MADE WITH CONFIDENCE AT THIS

POINT IS THAT IT APPEARS THAT THERE WILL BE A HARD FOUGHT CONTEST

FOR PRESIDENT.  INTERNATIONAL MONITORING WILL BE CRITICAL IF

THERE IS TO BE ANY REALISTIC HOPE THAT THE VOTERS WILL HAVE A

CHANCE OF MAKING A FREE AND FAIR CHOICE.

MCWILLIAMS

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 1035

date: 12/21/1999 9:27

refid: 99ALMATY12359

origin: US Office Almaty

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination:

header:

R 210927Z DEC 99

FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6195

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TASHKENT

AMEMBASSY BISHKEK

AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//DIA REP/CCJ2-JCH/CCJ5//

JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J2/J5//

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 012359

FROM EMBASSY DUSHANBE

DEPT FOR S/NIS - BEYRLE AND WILSON, EUR/CACEN -

BOND AND LEVINE

DEPT ALSO FOR INR/B

E.O. 12958:  DECL I2/20/09

TAGS:  PGOV, PINR, TI

SUBJECT:  TAJIKISTAN:  SCENES FROM A BACK-ROOM

RESHUFFLE

REF:  FBIS RESTON VA 200804Z DEC 99

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DOUGLAS B. KENT FOR REASON

1.5 (D).

1.  (C) SUMMARY.  PRESIDENT RAHMONOV IS

RESHUFFLINQ HIS CABINET.  A CABINET INSIDER

DESCRIBED TO US HOW RAHMONOV, TRUE TO CHARACTER,

IS DOING THIS IN A WAY THAT MAXIMIZES THE

HUMILIATION OF EVERYONE INVOLVED.  HIS CHOICE FOR

PRIME MINISTER, THE RELATIVELY UNKNOWN AND

UNINFLUENTIAL OQIL OQILOV, WAS A SURPRISE TO MANY.

SOME SPECULATE THAT RAHMONOV'S MAIN INTEREST WAS

IN APPOINTINQ SOMEONE WHO HASN'T MADE TOO MUCH

MONEY WORKINQ IN THE GOTI.  END SUMMARY.

2.  (C) GENERAL HABIB SANQINOV, DEPUTY MINISTER OF

INTERIOR IN THE GOTI, SUMMONED EMBASSY SENIOR FSN

DECEMBER 14 TO DISCUSS HIS VIEWS OF PRESIDENT

RAHMONOV'S PLANS FOR RESHUFFLINQ HIS CABINET --

PLANS THAT LED TO THE DECEMBER 20 APPOINTMENT OF

OQIL OQILOV AS THE NEW PRIME MINISTER (REFTEL).

3.  (C) SANQINOV DESCRIBED A MEETINQ RAHMONOV HAD

CALLED OF HIS SENIOR DEPUTIES ON OECEMBER 12.

STARTINQ WITH THEN-PRIME MINISTER YAHYO AZIMOV,

RAHMONOV BEQAN TO DISCUSS THE RESHUFFLE'S

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM.  PHYSICALLY CARESSINQ

AZIMOV TO MAXIMIZE THE MAN'S HUMILIATION, RAHMONOV

TOLD AZIMOV HE WOULD NOT BE LEFT WITHOUT A

POSITION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT (COMMENT:  WHAT

THAT WOULD BE, RAHMONOV DID NOT SAY, BUT IT MUST

HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO EVERYONE PRESENT THAT THE PRIME

MINISTER'S JOB WAS NOT WHAT RAHMONOV HAD IN MIND).

4.  (C) RAHMONOV THEN ADDRESSED, ONE BY ONE, HIS

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, MINISTERS, AND COMMITTEE

CHAIRMEN.  RAHMONOV ENCOURAQED SOME, LIKE DEPUTY

PRIME MINISTER ABDURAHMON AZIMOV, TO RUN IN

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR.  HE TOLD

OTHERS, LIKE BASQUL DODIKHUDOEVA, THAT HE WOULD

FIND SOME SORT OF POSITION IN THE NEXT QOVERNMENT

FOR THEM, ALTHOUQH HE AVOIDED PROMISINQ ANYTHINQ

SPECIFIC.  HE HAD NO SUQGESTIONS FOR SOME OTHERS,

SUCH AS ISMAT ESHMIRZOEV -- ALL THEY LEARNED WAS

THAT THEY WOULD SOON BE OUT OF A JOB.  OEPUTY

PRIME MINISTERS TURAJONZADA, VAZIROV, AND RASULOV

-- WHO HAVE BEEN IN OFFICE FOR LESS TIME THAN THE

OTHERS -- WILL STAY ON IN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS.

5.  (C) RAHMONOV TOLD HIS CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION,

MAHMADNAZAR SALIHOV, TO CONSIDER RUNNINQ FOR A

SEAT IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT.  SALIHOV -- TRUE TO

HIS NICKNAME, "MR. STUBBORN" -- OBJECTED.

RAHMONOV REBUKED HIM, RESPONDING THAT "WE WILL

WAIT AND SEE WHETHER YOU WILL AQREE TO DO SO OR

NOT."  ACCORDINQ TO SANQINOV, THE MEETINQ LEFT THE

FATE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY

AMIRKUL AZIMOV UNKNOWN (NOTE:  AZIMOV SERVES AS

RAHMONOV'S TROUBLE-SHOOTER, MOST RECENTLY DURINQ

THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF

UZBEKISTAN QUERILLA FORCE OPERATINQ ON

TAJIKISTAN'S TERRITORY AND SEIZINQ KYRQYZ AND

JAPANESE HOSTAQES IN KYRQYZSTAN.)

6.  (C) ALSO DISCUSSED AT THE MEETINQ WERE

RAHMONOV'S POLITICAL OPPONENTS.  SANQINOV

DESCRIBED A VINDICTIVE RAHMONOV RAILINQ AQAINST

HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIQN OPPONENT, OAVLAT USMON,

AND HIS WOULD-BE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIQN OPPONENTS,

SULTAN QUVVATOV AND SEYFIDDIN TURAYEV.  RAHMONOV

SAID HE PLANNED TO "PURSUE" TURAYEV (COMMENT:

PROBABLY THE MOST POPULAR OF THE THREE) TO THE

POINT WHERE TURAYEV LEFT THE COUNTRY.  (COMMENT:

RAHMONOV NEVER MAKES PEACE WITH HIS RIVALS --

ABDUMALIK ABDULLAJANOV, WHO FLED TO UZBEKISTAN, IS

ANOTHER CASE IN POINT).

NEW PRIME MINISTER'S BIODATA

---------------------------

7.  (C) OQIL OQILOV (ALTERNATIVE SPELLINQ:  AKIL

AKILOV) WAS BORN IN 1944 IN KHOJAND, LENINABAD

REQION (THE NORTHERN PART OF TAJIKISTAN).  AFTER

QRADUATINQ IN CONSTRUCTION ENQINEERINQ FROM A

MOSCOW INSTITUTE, HE WORKED AS A KHOJAND CITY

GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION OFFICIAL, EVENTUALLY

BECOMINQ MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION IN THE

QOVERNMENT OF THE THEN-TAJIK S.S.R.  HE REMAINED

IN THE QOVERNMENT THROUQH INDEPENDENCE AND THE

CIVIL WAR.  RAHMONOV APPOINTED HIM DEPUTY PRIME

MINISTER IN LATE 1994.  HE SERVED IN THIS POSITION

UNTIL RAHMONOV SENT HIM PACKINQ IN 1997.  HE

RETURNED TO KHOJAND, WHERE HE WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY

CHAIRMAN OF THE REQIONAL HUKUMAT (GOVERNMENT).

COMMENT

-------

8.  (C) OQILOV'S APPOINTMENT COMES AS A SURPRISE -

- HE IS CONSIDERABLY LESS WELL-KNOW AND LESS

INFLUENTIAL THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO

WERE APPARENTLY IN THE RUNNINQ, SUCH AS DUSHANBE

MAYOR AND RAHMONOV CONFIDANT MAHMADSAID

UBAIDULLOEV.  LIKE HIS PREDECESSOR, AZIMOV, HE IS

A NORTHERNER, AND HIS REGIONAL IDENTITY PROBABLY

PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN HIS SELECTION, WITH

RAHMONOV KEEPINQ HIS BASE OF SUPPORT BROADER THAN

HIS NATIVE KULYAB REQION IN THE SOUTH.

9.  (C) SOME OBSERVERS SPECULATE THAT OQILOV'S

BEINQ OUT OF POWER, AND OUT OF THE CAPITAL, FOR AN

EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME PLAYED IN HIS FAVOR.

RAHMONOV, THEY SAY, WANTED TO APPOINT SOMEONE WHO

HAD NOT MADE AS MUCH MONEY IN QOVERNMENT AS HIS

CURRENT CABINET MEMBERS.  TO ILLUSTRATE THE BANDIT

CULTURE PREVAILINQ IN THE RAHMONOV REQIME,

SANQINOV TOLD EMBASSY SENIOR FSN OF A RECENT VISIT

TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABDURAHMON AZIMOV'S

OFFICE.  AS THEY WERE TALKINQ, A TELEPHONE CALL

FROM PRIME MINISTER YAHYO AZIMOV CAME THROUQH.  IN

FRONT OF SANQINOV, ABDURAHMON AZIMOV COMPLAINED TO

THE PRIME MINISTER THAT "YOU HAVE BOUQHT ALMOST

HALF OF KHOJAND AND HAVE ENOUQH TO LIVE ON.  I

HAVE NOT QOT ANYTHINQ BEHIND ME AND HAVE NO

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE!"

KENT

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 13659

date: 2/1/2004 5:20

refid: 04DUSHANBE170

origin: Embassy Dushanbe

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination: 04DUSHANBE146|04DUSHANBE2|04DUSHANBE90

header:

P R 010520Z FEB 04

FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1282

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

CIA WASHDC

CIS COLLECTIVE

DIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

ISLAMABAD PK

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

NSC WASHDC

USMISSION OSCE

AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION US UN NEW YORK NY

USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

USMISSION USEU BRUSSELS

RUFGTCC USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GR

USMISSION USNATO

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L  DUSHANBE 000170

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN - BANKS, DRL

MOSCOW FOR WOOSTER

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/29/09

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, KISL, KDEM, KPAO, TI

SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:  ISLAMIC PARTY'S KABIRI UNPLUGGED

REF: (A) DUSHANBE 146; (B) DUSHANBE 90; (C) DUSHANBE 02

CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD HOAGLAND, AMB, EXEC, STATE.

REASON: 1.5 (D)

1.  (C) Summary:  At a small dinner party on January 29, First

Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Revival Party Muhiddin Kabiri

freely discussed the upcoming elections and his party's chances

of success.  Drawing on his experiences in the last

parliamentary elections, he opined that President Rahmonov would

ensure that his party retains power by any means possible.

Kabiri said that Rahmonov retains popularity, but the next

generation of voters will look for concrete economic

achievements before casting their votes for him.  Kabiri, like

his party, looks to the 2010 parliamentary elections as the

target date for possible change.  End summary.

2.  (C) DCM participated on January 29 in a small dinner hosted

by a German Embassy colleague whose featured guest was Muhiddin

Kabiri, the first deputy chairman of the Islamic Revival Party

of Tajikistan (IRPT).  Arriving in his newly acquired Mercedes

Benz 500 series sedan, and more nattily attired than the rest of

the guests, Kabiri declined offers of wine and champagne and

settled for downing three or four beers during his stay of five

and one-half hours.  Over a tasty Persian meal of fessenjun,

coo-coo, and mastakhiar, Kabiri discussed the upcoming

elections, the role of the IRPT in Tajikistan, and his own

political ambitions.

3.  (C) Kabiri said that the 2005 parliamentary election would

not result in any change of power.  Referring to his own

parliamentary campaign in Faizobad during the last election in

2000, Kabiri said that after the first round of voting he was

the front-runner with 48% of the vote.  Though he had the

support of all the other opposition candidates for the second

round, his votes totaled only 48.5%, and the candidate from the

President's party, the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan

(PDPT), won.

4.  (C) Kabiri said that after the first round results were in,

some government officials approached him and suggested that he

take the post of ambassador to Iran or to Turkey rather than

continue a fruitless campaign to enter parliament.  He was

specifically told that he had no chance to win the election.

Kabiri demurred, though he knew the government would not allow

him to win a seat in parliament.  A good friend who was leader

of one of the small municipalities told Kabiri that President

Rahmonov had called him in and ordered him to make sure that

Kabiri did not win.  Kabiri's friend told him that "I had no

choice but to do the President's bidding, but because of our

friendship I want you to know what happened."

5.  (C) In discussing the upcoming elections, Kabiri said that

the IRPT had a long-term outlook.  (See Ref A)  Realistically

speaking, Kabiri said, the IRPT would not win even if the next

election were fair and transparent.  (He hastened to add,

however, that this would not/not be the case.)  The IRPT is

looking to the next parliamentary election -- in 2010 -- as the

one when a viable alternative to Rahmonov could emerge.  This

would be the first election in which the post-civil war

generation would participate, and their desire for increased

economic opportunities would not be flavored by the desire for

stability that overrides any democratic tendencies in most of

the present electorate.  Nonetheless, the President is flexing

his muscles and chipping away at the IRPT with the recent arrest

of Shamsiddinov (Ref B).

6.  (C) President Rahmonov, according to Kabiri, already has

started his campaign for parliamentary elections.  By

intimidating independent media, Rahmonov wants to ensure that

not much light is shined on his election tactics.  (Ref C)  And,

Kabiri averred, Rahmonov plans to subvert the international

community's urging to reform the current election law by "taking

over" the process.  Once he -- via the PDPT's control of

parliament -- brings a draft election law before parliament, any

reforms will only be to increase the President's hold on power.

7.  (C) Kabiri readily admits that Rahmonov himself is popular

with the electorate.  In a private and confidential poll

conducted by the IRPT, Rahmonov was the favorite for almost half

of those polled.  The second leading candidate -- who Kabiri

would not name -- had support from 11% of those polled, and

Nuri, the leader of the IRPT, garnered 8%.

8.  (C) Regarding the future of the IRPT, Kabiri said that it is

considering changing its name, perhaps removing "Islam" from it.

Nuri decided that it might be time to do so and discussed this

with the President.  Rahmonov told him that it would not be a

good idea at the present time, and Kabiri characterized

Rahmonov's reasoning as Machiavellian -- the President likes to

hold up the IRPT to foreign visitors as the only legal Islamic

party in Central Asia and wants to raise the specter of an

Islamic "Taliban style" party to the electorate.  Kabiri also

said that Nuri was ready to leave the leadership of the party

and turn it over to him, but Kabiri said he was not yet ready to

assume this position.

9.  (C) In fact, Kabiri said he was prepared to support a

candidate for president from any of the opposition parties, if

only there were a viable candidate.  The only person who Kabiri

believes could measure up is Rahmatullo Zoirov, leader of the

Social Democrat Party of Tajikistan.  But as Kabiri said he told

Zoirov, "if only you were Tajik, you could be president."

(Zoirov is an ethnic Uzbek.)

10.  (C) Bio note:  Kabiri was open and frank in his assessments

and commented how much he enjoyed the discussion.  Unlike most

Tajik politicians, he relishes hard questions, and he answered

them thoughtfully.  He spoke in Tajiki and English, and although

he clearly preferred Tajiki, his English language skills were

more than adequate.  He obtained his new Mercedes only two weeks

ago.  He owns a company that imports Russian cars and cranes,

selling many of them in Afghanistan.  One Afghan customer could

not pay for the delivery of a crane and gave Kabiri the Mercedes

instead.  It's likely that Kabiri will sell the car soon rather

than risk trying to service it in Dushanbe -- the closest

Mercedes Benz dealer is thousands of miles away.

11.  (U) Kabul minimize considered.

HOAGLAND

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 13965

date: 2/13/2004 15:39

refid: 04BRUSSELS666

origin: Embassy Brussels

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

destination:

header:

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000666

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KZ, KG, TI, TX, UZ, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS

SUBJECT: US-EU COEST CONSULTATIONS PART 1: CENTRAL ASIA

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 9 in Brussels, EUR DAS Lynn

Pascoe -- accompanied by EUR/ACE Deputy Dan Rosenblum and

EUR/ERA Director Kathy Allegrone -- discussed US-EU

cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus with the

EU's COEST Troika.  This cable covers the Central Asia

portion of the consultations.  The South Caucasus portion

will be reported septel.

-- Kazakhstan: Country remains relative bright spot in

region, but still needs outside pressure to continue reforms;

immediate priority is for US and EU to coordinate closely on

the ground during run up to parliamentary elections.

-- Uzbekistan: EU shares US concerns about new NGO

registration procedures; EU considering how to respond to

UNHRC resolution; wants to be firm on HR without pushing

Karimov away.

-- Kyrgyzstan: EU is pleased with Kyrgyzstan's extension of

death penalty moratorium, but sees progress on new election

code as insufficient; new Commission office in Bishkek will

provide opportunity for enhanced US-EU pre-election

coordination.

-- Tajikistan: Commission soon to open office in Dushanbe;

will emphasize border controls and counternarcotics in

upgraded dialogue with Tajikistan.

-- Chinese Policies: EU keen to hear US views on Chinese

regional policies; glad to learn US views them as generally

non-threatening with regard to Central Asia.  END SUMMARY.

Regional Comments

-----------------

2. (SBU) Irish Presidency rep Barbara Jones said she had

recently met with the Russian Ambassador to the OSCE in

Vienna, who did not see the US/EU/OSCE as having a role to

play in the democratization of the region.  Jones concluded

from this that much of the U.S. and EU effort would therefore

be bilateral, as Russia would limit the OSCE's role in the

region.  Commission Central Asia and Caucasus Director Kurt

Juul said he has noted increased Russian and Chinese interest

in Central Asia; the EU will continue its focus on regional

programs but the challenge is for the countries of Central

Asia to take concrete steps on political and economic

reforms.  Commissioner Patten plans to visit Central Asia in

March.  Since the last COEST Troika, Juul said that the EU

has initialed a partnership and Cooperation Agreement with

Tajikistan.

Turkmenistan

------------

3. (SBU) Juul said the EU has noted an increased desire on

the part of Turkmenistan for a dialogue with the EC.

Following the EU's recent formal trade and cooperation

meeting with the Turkmen, an informal discussion was held

that included an extensive review of human rights issues.

The EU, Juul said, was encouraged and is prepared to test the

waters with Ashgabat and engage the Turkmen further.

Kazakhstan

----------

4. (SBU) Juul termed events in Kazakhstan as reflecting an

increasingly "normal" development, with some positive

movement on human rights issues.  He said that European

companies remain excited about the business potential of

Kazakhstan,s increasing role as a major energy supplier.

While serious concerns about the business environment

persist, European companies seemed committed to continuing

their engagement with the GOK, he said.  Juul noted that

Russian companies also seemed increasingly interested in

investing in the Kazakh private sector.

Pascoe agreed that Kazakhstan,s energy assets and early

reform efforts pointed toward a brighter future than most of

its neighbors, but cautioned that we should continue pressing

Nazarbayev to consolidate the positive changes and follow

through on his reform commitments.  Jones pointed out that

Nazarbayev,s apparent effort to crown his daughter for

presidential succession did not bode well for ongoing

political reforms.  Pascoe agreed that it bore watching, but

noted that Kazakhstan had a large pool of competent

progressive officials who would work for progress.  The

immediate priority, he said, was for the US and EU to

coordinate closely on the ground during the run up to

parliamentary elections to ensure a positive pre-election

environment and broader political representation in the new

parliament.  Jones emphatically agreed, and said she would

push for the same kind of close coordination that we have

benefited from in Ukraine.  She would also support a

Brussels-Washington link if it helped with coordination on

the ground, but noted that field coordination would, as

usual, be most fruitful.

Uzbekistan

----------

5. (SBU) The EU agreed with Pascoe that Uzbekistan posed a

particular challenge because on the one hand it remains a

notable human rights violator while on the other it continues

to make progress ) albeit grudging and halting ) on

political reform.  Uzbekistan has not strayed from its

determination to do just enough to keep the West off its

back.  Karimov had yet to realize that political and economic

reform was necessary for Uzbekistan,s development, Pascoe

said.  Yet firm pressure works in Central Asia, Juul

observed, and should be maintained; but we must also be

careful to recognize the positive steps as they are taken.

Both sides agreed that the key challenge was to maintain a

firm line with Karimov while also not pushing him away from

the table.

6. (SBU) Jones said the EU shared US concerns about

Tashkent,s new NGO policy, and did not accept FM Safayev,s

explanation that the transfer of NGO monitoring authority

from the Foreign to the Interior Ministry was a technical

shift only. Irish COEST Deputy Chair Peter McIver said that

Safayev told the EU at Cooperation Council meeting on January

27 that the government made the change because the Foreign

Ministry could only assign one staffer to the NGO office,

while the Interior Ministry had more resources and could thus

do a better job.  The EU found the assertion laughable, Jones

said, but their overall impression of Safayev had been

positive.  The Council Secretariat,s Michael Swann said that

Human Rights Watch (HRW) had visited his office the day after

the Cooperation Council meetings.  HRW claimed that Safayev,

while slick and well-spoken, was no better than the others,

and had been sent because Karimov thought his considerable

charm could woo the West.  HRW said it would accuse the EU of

backpeddling if the Conclusions issued by January's meetings

were any softer than those of earlier EU-Uzbekistan meetings.

7. (SBU) Jones said the EU is still discussing how to handle

a resolution on Uzbekistan in the UNHRC this year.  The EU

felt bound to call Tashkent on its abuses, but was also keen

not to do anything that might disrupt Uzbekistan's grudging

progress.  Pascoe said the US shared the dilemma.  He also

noted that Karimov has lately been asking for support on

education reform.  Donors should consider how to take

advantage of this opening.  Jones said the EU would consider

its options.  Jones closed by observing that March and April

would be active months for Uzbekistan, with UNHRC and visits

to the country by the EBRD and Commissioner Patten (March

14).  Jones and Pascoe agreed that it would be useful to

regroup and together assess next steps after these events.

Kyrgyzstan

----------

8. (SBU) Dutch Deputy Director Renette van der Waal conveyed

a mixed EU assessment of Kyrgyz progress.  The EU was pleased

with Kyrgyzstan's extension of the death penalty moratorium,

but thought that insufficient progress was being made on the

new election code.  Juul said the EU would meet with Akayev

in March and would discuss progress on human rights, civil

society and economic reform.  Pascoe agreed with the mixed

assessment, but said that the mix leaned more heavily to the

positive side than the negative.  Kyrgyzstan is undertaking

some good reforms, he said, but the efforts are hampered by

Kyrgyzstan's poverty and lack of resources and experience.

Jones said she would task the German Embassy (representing EU

interests) and the soon to be opened Commission delegation in

Bishkek to begin coordinating pre-election activities as soon

as possible with the US Embassy.

Tajikistan

----------

9. (SBU) Pascoe said political stability and the drug trade

continued to be Tajikistans' biggest challenges.    Our main

push is to help the country to normality.  Pascoe also said

the US was pleased that the Commission had decided to open a

delegation in Dushanbe.  Juul said the EU's upgraded dialogue

with Tajikistan would emphasize border controls and

counternarcotics.  Swann echoed Juul's statement and pointed

out that countering drugs and organized crime was moving up

the EU's international agenda in light of the recently

adopted European Security Strategy.

China,s Central Asia Policy

---------------------------

10. (SBU) Pascoe fielded several questions from Troika

members keen to hear US views on China,s Central Asia

policy.  In response, Pascoe said that China,s actions

appeared fairly transparent, and motivated by obvious

security and energy interests.  Asked about the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), Pascoe said that the SCO

appeared hobbled by a lack of financial support from anywhere

save Beijing.  The US had expressed an interest in observer

status, but neither the Chinese nor the Russians seemed

enthusiastic about this.  (COMMENT: The EU did not offer a

view of its own, seeming instead to be in search of

information that would help the EU determine if it should be

concerned about China,s increasing interest in its western

neighborhood.  Several Troika members appeared relieved to

learn that the US did not view China,s engagement in Central

Asia, including the SCO, as a major threat.  END COMMENT.)

Dushanbe minimize consi

dered. 

Источник: ИА "Авеста"
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